| 1. |
- Alexius, Annika, et al.
(författare)
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Monetary Policy and Swedish Unemployment Fluctuations
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A widely spread belief among economists is that monetary policy has relatively short-lived effects on real variables such as unemployment. Previous studies indicate that monetary policy affects the output gap only at business cycle frequencies, but the effects on unemployment may well be more persistent in countries with highly regulated labor markets. We study the Swedish experience of unemployment and monetary policy. Using a structural VAR we find that around 30 percent of the fluctuations in unemployment are caused by shocks to monetary policy. The effects are also quite persistent. In the preferred model, almost 30 percent of the maximum effect of a shock still remains after ten years.
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| 2. |
- Bengtsson, Niklas, et al.
(författare)
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Lifetime versus Annual Tax-and-Transfer Progressivity : Sweden, 1968-2009
- 2016
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Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - : Wiley. - 0347-0520 .- 1467-9442. ; 118:4, s. 619-645
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we analyze the evolution of tax-and-transfer progressivity in Sweden over both annual and lifetime horizons. Using a rich micro panel covering the period 1968-2009, we calculate tax rates over a cohort's entire working life cycle. Our main finding is that taxes are considerably less progressive over the lifetime than in any single year. Social insurance transfers to transitory low-income earners account for most of this result. We offer a number of robustness checks of the measurement of lifetime incomes and progressivity, but none of them changes our overall findings.
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| 3. |
- Bengtsson, Niklas, et al.
(författare)
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Lifetime versus Annual Tax Progressivity : Sweden, 1968–2009
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes the evolution of tax progressivity in Sweden from both annual and lifetime perspectives. Using a rich micro panel with administrative records of incomes, taxes and benefits over the period 1968–2009, we calculate tax rates across the income distribution accounting for different tax bases as well as the role of transfers. The uniquely long time span also allows us to compute tax progressivity as realized over a cohort’s entire life cycle. Our main finding is that taxes are considerably less progressive over the lifetime than in any single year. In fact, life cycle taxes are close to proportional, bearing a redistributive effect of only a few percent. Intragenerational income mobility seems to be driving this result, although the Swedish economic crisis of the 1990s and the tax reforms of 1971 and 1991 are also important. Labor income taxes contribute less to progressivity in recent years, whereas transfers to unemployed and old-age pensioners have become increasingly important. These findings are robust to the use of different tax rates, tax bases, sample populations, rates of discounting and controls for reranking.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Bennmarker, Helge, et al.
(författare)
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Do Benefit Hikes Damage Job Finding? Evidence from Swedish Unemployment Insurance Reforms
- 2005
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In 2001 and 2002, Sweden introduced several unemployment insurance reforms. A major innovation in the first reform was the introduction of a two-tiered benefit structure for some unemployed individuals. This system involved supplementary compensation during the first 20 weeks of unemployment. The 2002 reform retained the two-tiered benefit structure but involved also substantial benefit hikes for spells exceeding 20 weeks. This paper examines how these reforms affected transitions from unemployment to employment. We take advantage of the fact that the reforms had quasi-experimental features where the “treatments” differed considerably among unemployed individuals. We find that the reforms had strikingly different effects on job finding among men and women. The two reforms in conjunction are estimated to have increased the expected duration of unemployment among men but to have decreased the duration of unemployment among women. The overall effect on the duration of unemployment is not statistically different from zero. However, the reforms reduced job finding among males who remained unemployed for more than 20 weeks.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Björklund, Anders, 1950-, et al.
(författare)
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Arbetsmarknaden
- 2014. - 4
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 8. |
- Boone, Jan, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions
- 2001
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt. The optimal sanction rates implied by our calibrated model are much higher than the sanction rates typically observed in European labor markets.
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Boone, Jan, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions
- 2007
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Ingår i: Economic Journal. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0013-0133 .- 1468-0297. ; 117:518, s. 399-421
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt.
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