| 1. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, et al.
(författare)
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Anonymity, Reciprocity, and Conformity: Evidence from Voluntary Contributions to a National Park in Costa Rica
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary contributions, based on a natural field experiment conducted at a national park in Costa Rica. Contributions made in public in front of the solicitor are 25% higher than contributions made in private. Giving subjects a small gift before requesting a contribution increases the likelihood of a positive contribution. At the same time, the conditional contribution decreases. The total effect of giving a gift is positive but small, and taking the cost of the gift into account, it is far from profitable. When the subjects are told that the typical contribution of others is $2 (a small contribution), the probability of a contribution increases and the conditional contribution decreases, compared with providing no reference information. Providing a high reference level ($10) increases the conditional contributions. Overall, the total effects have the expected signs, although the magnitudes are smaller than what one might have expected based on existing evidence from laboratory experiments.
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| 2. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
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How Much Do We Care About Absolute Versus Relative Income and Consumption?
- 2001
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We find, using survey-experimental methods, that most individuals are concerned with both relative income and relative consumption of particular goods. The degree of concern varies in the expected direction depending on the properties of the good. However, contrary to what has been suggested in the previous literature, we find that relative consumption is also important for vacation and insurance, which are typically seen as non-positional goods. Further, absolute consumption is also found to be important for cars and housing, which are widely regarded as highly positional. Implications for Pareto-efficient taxation are illustrated using the results from the experiment.
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| 3. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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A Note on Optimal Taxation, Status Consumption, and Unemployment
- 2020
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Existing research on optimal taxation in economies with status-driven relative consumption assumes that the labor market is competitive, despite the fact that real world labor markets are typically characterized by involuntary unemployment. We show how the marginal tax policy ought to be modified to simultaneously account for positional consumption externalities and equilibrium unemployment, and find that interaction effects between these two market failures are crucial determinants of the marginal tax structure. In certain cases, the policy incentive to tax away positional externalities vanishes completely, and negative positional externalities may even lead to lower marginal taxation, under involuntary unemployment.
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| 4. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Animal Welfare and Social Decisions
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes the standard welfare economics assumption of anthropocentric welfarism, i.e., that only human well-being counts intrinsically. Alternatives where animal welfare matters intrinsically are explored theoretically, based on moral philosophical literature, and empirically where the general public‘s ethical preferences are measured through a survey with a representative sample in Sweden. It is concluded that welfare economics should be generalized in order to encompass the idea that animal welfare should sometimes matter intrinsically.
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| 5. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Charity as income redistribution : a model with optimal taxation, status, and social stigma
- 2019
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In light of the increasing inequality in many countries, this paper analyzes redistributive charitable giving from the rich to the poor in a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. Our framework integrates (i) public and private redistribution, (ii) the warm glow of giving and stigma of receiving charitable donations, and (iii) status concerns emanating from social comparisons with respect to charitable donations and private consumption. Whether charity should be taxed or supported largely depends on the relative strengths of the warm glow of giving and the stigma of receiving charity, respectively, and on the positional externalities caused by charitable donations. In addition, imposing stigma on the mimicker (which relaxes the self-selection constraint) strengthens the case for subsidizing charity. We also consider a case where the government is unable to target the charitable giving through a direct tax instrument, and we examine how the optimal marginal income tax structure should be adjusted in response to charitable giving. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the quantitative effects of the aforementioned mechanisms can be substantial.
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| 6. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Charity, status, and optimal taxation : welfarist and paternalist approaches
- 2019
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper deals with tax policy responses to charitable giving, defined in terms of voluntary contributions to a public good, to which the government also contributes through public revenue; the set of tax instruments contains general, nonlinear taxes on income and charitable giving. In addition to consumption, leisure and a public good, individuals obtain utility from the warm glow of giving and social status generated by their relative contributions to charity as well as their relative consumption compared with others. We analyze the conditions under which it is optimal to tax or subsidize charitable giving and derive corresponding optimal policy rules. Another aim of the paper is to compare the optimal tax policy and public good provision by a conventional welfarist government with those by two kinds of paternalist governments: The first kind does not respect the consumer preferences for status in terms of relative giving and relative consumption, while the second kind in addition does not respect preferences for warm glow of giving. The optimal policy rules for marginal taxation and public good provision are similar across governments, except for the stronger incentive to tax charitable giving at the margin under the more extensive kind of paternalism. Numerical simulations supplement the theoretical results.
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| 7. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Charity, Status, and Optimal Taxation: Welfarist and Non-Welfarist Approaches
- 2021
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes optimal taxation of charitable giving to a public good in a Mirrleesian framework with social comparisons. Leisure separability together with zero transaction costs of giving imply that charitable giving should be subsidized to such an extent that governmental contributions are completely crowded out, regardless of whether the government acknowledges warm glows of giving. Stronger concerns for relative charitable giving and larger transaction costs support lower marginal subsidies, whereas relative consumption concerns work in the other direction. A dual screening approach, where charitable giving constitutes an indicator of wealth, is also presents. Numerical simulations supplement the theoretical results.
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| 8. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation when both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter
- 2009
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Previous studies on public policy under relative consumption concerns have ignored the role of leisure comparisons. This paper considers a two-type optimal nonlinear income tax model where people care both about their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both the high-ability and the low-ability type, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component, i.e., a component that is larger for the high-ability than for the low-ability type. Moreover, leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public good provision when the income tax is optimally chosen.
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| 9. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Genuine Saving and Conspicuous Consumption
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Much evidence suggests that people are concerned with their relative consumption, i.e., their consumption in relation to the consumption of others. Yet, the social costs of conspicuous consumption have so far played little (or no) role in savings-based indicators of sustainable development. The present paper examines the implications of such behavior for measures of sustainable development by deriving analogues to genuine saving when people are concerned with their relative consumption. Unless the resource allocation is a social optimum, an indicator of positional externalities must be added to genuine saving to arrive at the proper measure of intertemporal welfare change. A numerical example based on U.S. and Swedish data suggests that conventional measures of genuine saving (which do not reflect conspicuous consumption) are likely to largely overestimate this welfare change. We also show how relative consumption concerns affect the way public investment ought to be reflected in genuine saving.
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| 10. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Genuine Saving and Conspicuous Consumption
- 2016
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Much evidence suggests that people are concerned with their relative consumption, i.e., their own consumption relative to that of others. Yet, conspicuous consumption and the corresponding social costs have so far been ignored in savings-based indicators of sustainable development. The present paper examines the implications of relative consumption concerns for measures of sustainable development by deriving analogues to genuine saving when people are concerned with their relative consumption. Unless the positional externalities have been fully internalized, an indicator of such externalities must be added to genuine saving to arrive at the proper measure of intertemporal welfare change. A numerical example based on U.S. and Swedish data suggests that conventional measures of genuine saving (which do not reflect conspicuous consumption) are likely to largely overestimate this welfare change. We also show how relative consumption concerns affect the way public investment ought to be reflected in genuine saving.
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