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- Flam, Harry, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal Subsidies to Declining Industries : Efficiency and Equity Considerations
- 1982
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper consider equity vs. efficiency in a small economy that subsidizes an industry facing falling world market prices. Subsidies keep up output in the short run when wages and factors are rigid. But once introduced subsidies become permanent, because of pressures from vested interests. This creates misallocation of resources in the long run. An optimal efficiency subsidy balances the short-run gains and long-run losses. It should be raised when prices fall if there is full employment initially and lowered if there is unemployment. An optimal distribution subsidy, which aims at maintaining the sxisting income distribution, should always be raised.
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| 4. |
- Frey, Bruno S., et al.
(författare)
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A Formulation and Test of a Simple Model of World Bank Behavior
- 1983
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- There exists a large literature describing the behavior of international institutions. This literature is however, with few exceptions, purely descriptive, i.e. it lacks an analysis based on clearly stated behavioral assumptions leading to falsifiable and hence empirically testable hypotheses. A positive theory of the behavior of international organizations is thus lacking. This paper endeavours to provide a simple theoretical model of the behavior of such an international organization - The World Bank - using the traditional approach of maximizing a utility function subject to constraints (Sections 2 and 3). The theoretically derived hypotheses are empirically applied to the World Bank's granting of loans to developing countries during recent years (Section 4). A final part summarizes the main findings (Section 5).
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| 8. |
- Kotlikoff, Laurence J., et al.
(författare)
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Social Contracts as Assets : A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem
- 1987
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper presents a new solution to the time-consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work. The solution involves formulating a social contract, institution, or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy. The social contract is effectively sold by succesive old generations to successive young generations, who pay for the social contract through the payment of taxes. Both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract. For the old generation, breaking the social contract makes the social contract valueless, and the generation suffers a capital loss by not being able to sell it. For the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing social contract exceeds its price as well as the economic gain from setting up the a new social contract.
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| 10. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Options for Economic and Political Reform in Sweden
- 1993
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper summarises an official report to the Swedish government (and general public). The economic crisis in Sweden is explained by both system failures and specific policy mistakes. The system failures include distorted incentives and markets, and inappropriate and outdated institutions. The deep recession and extraordinary rise in unemployment started as a collision between inflationary wage development and attempts to pursue a hard-currency policy. The resulting loss of international competitiveness in the tradable sector was accompanied by increased real interest rates, collapsing real estate prices and a related financial crisis. Following the floating of the Swedish krona in November 1992, the main problem became a domestic demand collapse, which has been accentuated by a spectacular rise in the household saving rate. The report emphasizes that good policy advice is not enough; it is also necessary to analyse and reform not only to macroeconomic stability but also economic efficiency and growth. The proposed institutional reforms are designed to restore a highly competitive market system and to facilitate a responsible fiscal stabilisation programme. This would also enahnce the medium-run credibility for government policies and provide scope for a more expansionary policy in the short run.
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