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- Wahlberg, Lena, et al.
(författare)
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The Role of the Expert Witness
- 2021
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Ingår i: Philosophical Foundations of Evidence Law. - 9780198859307 ; , s. 53-66
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 4. |
- Fenton, Norman, et al.
(författare)
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The opportunity prior : A simple and practical solution to the prior probability problem for legal cases
- 2017
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL 2017. - New York, NY, USA : ACM. - 9781450348911 ; , s. 69-78
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- One of the greatest impediments to the use of probabilistic reasoning in legal arguments is the difficulty in agreeing on an appropriate prior probability for the ultimate hypothesis, (in criminal cases this is normally “Defendant is guilty of the crime for which he/she is accused”). Even strong supporters of a Bayesian approach prefer to ignore priors and focus instead on considering only the likelihood ratio (LR) of the evidence. But the LR still requires the decision maker (be it a judge or juror during trial, or anybody helping to determine beforehand whether a case should proceed to trial) to consider their own prior; without it the LR has limited value. We show that, in a large class of cases, it is possible to arrive at a realistic prior that is also as consistent as possible with the legal notion of ‘innocent until proven guilty’. The approach can be considered as a formalisation of the ‘island problem’ whereby if it is known the crime took place on an island when n people were present, then each of the people on the island has an equal prior probability 1/n of having carried out the crime. Our prior is based on simple location and time parameters that determine both a) the crime scene/time (within which it is certain the crime took place) and b) the extended crime scene/time which is the ‘smallest’ within which it is certain the suspect was known to have been ‘closest’ in location/time to the crime scene. The method applies to cases where we assume a crime has taken place and that it was committed by one person against one other person (e.g. murder, assault, robbery). The paper considers both the practical and legal implications of the approach. We demonstrate how the opportunity prior probability is naturally incorporated into a generic Bayesian network model that allows us to integrate other evidence about the case.
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- Zenker, Frank, et al.
(författare)
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Generalization in Legal Argumentation
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Forensic Psychology Research and Practice. - : Informa UK Limited. - 2473-2850 .- 2473-2842. ; 20:1, s. 80-99
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When interpreting a natural language argument that generalizes over a contextually relevant category, audiences are likely to activate the category prototype and transfer its characteristics onto category instances. A generalized argument can thus appear more (respectively less) persuasive than one mentioning a specific category instance, provided the argument’s claim is more (less) warranted for the prototype than for the instance (positive and negative prototype effect). To investigate this effect in legal contexts using mock-scenarios, professional and lay judges at Swedish courts evaluated the persuasiveness of arguments giving a generalized or a specific description of an eyewitness. The generalized version described the witness either as an alcohol-intoxicated person or as a child, while the specific version varied both the amount of alcohol consumed (two vs. five glasses of wine) and the child’s age (four vs. 12 years). To investigate the effect of legal expertise on argument selection, moreover, law and social science students evaluate the persuasiveness of both argument versions. Though we observed statistically significant prototype effects as well as expertise effects, results were mixed and sometimes ran counter to normative expectation.
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- Arvidsson, Niklas, et al.
(författare)
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Begreppet sedvana
- 2019
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Ingår i: Juridiska grundbegrepp. - 9789144127118 ; , s. 191-238
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 8. |
- Bergius, My, et al.
(författare)
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Are judges influenced by legally irrelevant circumstances?
- 2020
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Ingår i: Law, Probability and Risk. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1470-8396 .- 1470-840X. ; 19:2, s. 157-164
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Judges should not be influenced by legally irrelevant circumstances in their legal decision making and judges generally believe that they manage legally irrelevant circumstances well. The purpose of this experimental study was to investigate whether this self-image is correct. Swedish judges (N = 256) read a vignette depicting a case of libel, where a female student had claimed on her blog that she had been sexually harassed by a named male professor. The professor had sued the student for libel and the student retracted her claim during the hearing. Half of the judges received irrelevant information - that the professor himself had been convicted of libel a year earlier, while the other half did not receive this information. For the outcome variable, the judges were asked to state how much compensation the student should pay the professor. Those judges who received information about the professor himself having been convicted of libel stated that he should be given significantly less compensation than those who did not receive the irrelevant information. The results show that the judges’ decision was affected by legally irrelevant circumstances. Implications for research and practice are discussed
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