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- Fors, Fredrik, 1973-
(författare)
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Intelligence-led policing against organized crime – a case study
- 2010
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Intelligence-led policing against organized crime – a case studyIntelligence-led policing has been criticized for being mostly improved rhetoric describing traditional reactive police work, rather than something truly new and pro-active. In this paper, an in-depth case study is used in order to determine whether or not there are examples that real change has taken place. For example: among huge amounts of information, how do the police determine what intelligence that should be taken seriously and acted upon?The paper will cover what resulted in the shoot-out between the Swedish National Counter-Terrorism Unit and heavily armed criminals targeting a cash depot in Umeå in May, 2009. The police operation was initiated and guided by intelligence material, and can be seen as an example of pro-active, intelligence-led police work against organized crime. Based on a rich materiel, and by applying case methodology it will be possible to gain a deeper knowledge about intelligence-led police work. By that, theories concerning how the police try to apply intelligence-based methods in order to deal with organized crime might be tested.The paper will thus give a description of one of the most violent fire fights in Swedish police history; interesting given the restricted use of weapons by the Swedish police and the very rare case of stand-offs between the police and criminals. Thereby, the paper will provide a contribution to criminology research by doing a case study of one example of how the Swedish police deal with organized crime; in contrast to the more common macro/statistical methods within criminology.
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- Fors, Fredrik, 1973-
(författare)
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The police can and do learn : Tracing policy changes in the police work against organized crime
- 2011
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- The police can and do learn. Tracing policy changes in the police work against organized crime Bureaucracies in general, and the police in particular, are slow moving creatures, often unable to learn or improve their work. This is a common topic in criminological literature and other research covering the police. This paper will exemplify the opposite. By looking at a few case studies of aggravated robberies in 2005 and in 2008/2009, respectively, the paper will illustrate how the police actually learned or changed police policies. In particular, the paper will analyze change in the form of systematized intelligence analysis and the use of “target lists” of individuals participating in organized crime. A wide range of armed robberies against cash-in-transit vehicles were carried out in Sweden during the 1990s and the early 2000s. Two of the most spectacular ones occurred in August 2005. In one case, the robbers blocked off a highway, causing a massive traffic jam, and carried out the robbery in broad daylight. In the other, the robbers forced their way into a cash depot using a construction vehicle. After that, the Swedish police started to systematize the information they had about the criminals committing these robberies. The work involved the police at the national level, the regional police, security companies, and civil authorities with the aim of reducing the number of robberies by successfully coordinating information about suspects and have them convicted. Another example of how the Swedish police changed is the use of “target lists.” These lists consist of the names of criminals convicted and/or suspected of participating in organized crime, not least armed robberies against cash-in-transit vehicles and cash depots. In 2008 and 2009, other spectacular robberies occurred in Sweden. This paper argues that the way the Swedish police acted against those crimes can actually be seen as concrete examples of how the police have implemented policy changes, partially influenced by the aforementioned robberies in 2005.
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