| 1. |
- Hysing, Erik, 1977-, et al.
(author)
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Building acceptance for congestion charges – the Swedish experiences compared
- 2015
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In: Journal of Transport Geography. - : Elsevier BV. - 0966-6923 .- 1873-1236. ; 49, s. 52-60
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Lack of public and political acceptance is the main barrier to introducing congestion charges. Here we compared the experiences of congestion charge introduction in the Swedish cities of Stockholm and Gothenburg, with the aimof explaining differences in political and public acceptance. The results showed the importance of procedural factors, such as the consistency of objectives in policy packages, communication and marketing efforts, and the use of public referendums, and of contextual factors, including urban form, level of congestion, and functioning of public transport. Important lessonswere drawn between the two cities, but primarily on how to design, rather than secure public acceptance for, a congestion tax scheme. To build acceptance for congestion charges, close attention must be paid to the local political and geographical context when designing and implementing such a scheme.
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| 2. |
- Hysing, Erik, 1977-, et al.
(author)
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Compromising sustainable mobility? The case of the Gothenburg congestion tax
- 2015
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In: Journal of Environmental Planning and Management. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0964-0568 .- 1360-0559. ; 58:6, s. 1058�-1075
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Congestion charging is widely considered an effective policy measure to regulate and reduce car traffic demand and associated environmental and health problems in cities. However, introducing restrictive measures to constrain individual choice and behaviour for the common good has often proven difficult. Using a specific case, the Gothenburg congestion tax introduced in 2013, we study the policy process behind the introduction of the tax and assess to what extent green values were compromised along the way. The tax was made possible by co-financing infrastructure investments, including roads, which seemingly contradicts stated goals of reducing car traffic and emissions. We show how the tax was ‘muddled through’ in a top-down political compromise by a grand coalition where different interests could legitimate their support in relation to the achievement of partially conflicting objectives and projects. However, to declare the regulatory goals fully neutralised would be to underestimate the scheme’s direct environmental effects and restrictive potential. Finding a compromise with powerful political and economic interests was necessary to get it off the ground. Once launched, however, it can over time regain its restrictive properties and lead to more profound long-term effects.
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