Executive compensation disclosure, ownership concentration and dual-class firms: An analysis of Swedish data

• We study how executive compensation disclosure (ECD) is affected by the economic incentives of owners and managers in a Swedish setting where agency conflicts are not so much between managers and owners, but between controlling and non-controlling owners. In our sample, control is often enhanced through mechanisms such as dual share classes. The analysis relies on detailed hand-collected ECD data from 2837 annual reports. As expected, disclosure decreases with ownership concentration and the owner’s excess voting rights. In Sweden, overpaid Chief Executive Offices (CEOs) improve ECD quality, but this is not the case when the controlling owner has excess control rights. This suggests that when managers have a bond with controlling owners, ECD is part of the agency problem between controlling and non-controlling owners, and executive compensation plays a different role than in previously studied Anglo-Saxon settings.

Ämnesord

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Företagsekonomi (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business -- Business Administration (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Executive compensation

Disclosure Sweden

Dual class shares

Agency problems

Business and IT

Handel och IT

Publikations- och innehållstyp

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art (ämneskategori)