Experimental evaluation of sensor attacks and defense mechanisms in feedback systems

• We evaluate theoretical results, developed under linearity assumptions, on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. The goal is to determine if this sensor attack poses a threat to real systems as well. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the stealthy sensor attack is possible to conduct and the theoretical worst-case impact is close to the achieved practical one. However, although the attack should theoretically be possible when the controller has integral action, we show that the integral action slows the attacker down and the attacker is not able to remain stealthy if it has not perfect knowledge of the controller state. In addition to that, we investigate the effect of different anomaly detectors on the attack impact and our experiments indicate that the impact under detectors with internal dynamics is smaller for the considered attack objective. Finally, we demonstrate how noise injection into the controller dynamics can unveil the otherwise stealthy attacks.

Ämnesord

NATURVETENSKAP  -- Data- och informationsvetenskap -- Datavetenskap (hsv//swe)

NATURAL SCIENCES  -- Computer and Information Sciences -- Computer Sciences (hsv//eng)

TEKNIK OCH TEKNOLOGIER  -- Maskinteknik -- Tillförlitlighets- och kvalitetsteknik (hsv//swe)

ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY  -- Mechanical Engineering -- Reliability and Maintenance (hsv//eng)

TEKNIK OCH TEKNOLOGIER  -- Elektroteknik och elektronik -- Reglerteknik (hsv//swe)

ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY  -- Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering -- Control Engineering (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Resilient control systems

Attack detection

Cyber-physical security

Publikations- och innehållstyp

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