Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory

• The authors propose a methodological extension of quantitative "cost of protection" analyses to consider elementary game-theoretic aspects of the policy process. They illustrate these ideas by evaluating size propositions: nations can "win" trade wars; multilateral negotiations that "merely preserve the status quo" have some value; the terms of the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement can be strategically rationalized; threat points matter in trade negotiations; the negotiating practice of comparing the "value" of one country's concessions with another can dramatically influence bargaining outcomes; and that the substance of multilateral negotiations can be achieved by bilateral negotiations between the bigger countries.

Ämnesord

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business (hsv//eng)

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