Sökning: id:"swepub:oai:DiVA.org:su-155565" >
On the Ratio Challe...
On the Ratio Challenge for Comparativism
-
- Stefánsson, H. Orri (författare)
- Stockholms universitet,Filosofiska institutionen
-
(creator_code:org_t)
- 2017-07-24
- 2018
- Engelska.
-
Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 96:2, s. 380-390
- Relaterad länk:
-
https://urn.kb.se/re...
-
visa fler...
-
https://doi.org/10.1...
-
visa färre...
Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- This paper discusses a challenge for comparativists about belief, who hold that numerical degree of belief (in particular, subjective probability) is a useful fiction, unlike comparative belief, which they regard as real. The challenge is to make sense of claims like ‘I am twice as confident in A as in B’ in terms of comparative belief only. After showing that at least some comparativists can meet this challenge, I discuss implications for Zynda's [2000] and Stefánsson's [2017] defences of comparativism.
Ämnesord
- HUMANIORA -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)
- HUMANITIES -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)
Nyckelord
- comparativism
- ratios
- degrees of belief
- comparative belief
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ref (ämneskategori)
- art (ämneskategori)
Hitta via bibliotek
Till lärosätets databas