Strategic Interaction with Altruism : The Economics of Fait Accompli

• The present paper analyzes the strategic and intertemporal insteraction between two well-informed economic agents, who have more or less "altruistic" preferences vis-à-vis each others. The agents may be two individuals, a social bureau and a client, or two units in an organization, etc. It is shown that the presence of altruism in such situations easily leads to socially inefficient outcomes, in which one economic agent "free-rides" on the other's altruism. In the paper, a formal definition of free-riding is suggested, and necessary and sufficient conditions are given for it to occur in subgame perfect equilibrium. We also discuss how such free-riding might be mitigated by social security systems.

Ämnesord

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Economics

Nationalekonomi

Publikations- och innehållstyp

vet (ämneskategori)

rap (ämneskategori)