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Incentives in Compe...
Abstract
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- This paper proposes a labour market model with job search frictions where workers have private information on match quality and effort. Firms use wage contracts to motivate workers. In addition, wages are also used to attract employees. We define and characterize competitive search equilibrium in this context, and show that it satisfies a simple modified Hosios rule. We also analyse the interplay between macroeconomic variables and optimal wage contracts. Finally, we show that private information may increase the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in the aggregate productivity level and, in particular, to changes in the information structure.
Subject headings
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Keyword
- Private information
- Incentives
- Search
- Unemployment
- Wage rigidity
- Economics
- Nationalekonomi
Publication and Content Type
- ref (subject category)
- art (subject category)
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