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Why do politicians ...
Why do politicians implement central bank independence reforms?
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- Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov (författare)
- Högskolan Dalarna,Nationalekonomi,HUI Research
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- Hellström, Jörgen (författare)
- Umeå universitet,Företagsekonomi,Umeå University, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE)
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- Landström, Mats (författare)
- Högskolan Dalarna,Nationalekonomi
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(creator_code:org_t)
- 2013-09-11
- 2013
- Engelska.
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Ingår i: Atlantic Economic Journal. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0197-4254 .- 1573-9678. ; 41:4, s. 427-438
- Relaterad länk:
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Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- The purpose of this paper is to investigate why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to fine-tune the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries, of which 86 countries had implemented such reforms, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country has been characterized by a high variability in historical inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.
Ämnesord
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Nyckelord
- Inflation
- Institutional reforms
- Monetary policy
- Time-inconsistency
- Economics
- nationalekonomi
- General Microdata Analysis - others
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ref (ämneskategori)
- art (ämneskategori)
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