Sökning: id:"swepub:oai:gup.ub.gu.se/167409" >
Climate negotiation...
Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty
-
Barrett, Scott (författare)
-
- Dannenberg, Astrid (författare)
- Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik,Department of Economics
-
(creator_code:org_t)
- 2012-10-08
- 2012
- Engelska.
-
Ingår i: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. - : Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. - 0027-8424. ; 109:43, s. 17372-17376
- Relaterad länk:
-
https://www.pnas.org...
-
visa fler...
-
https://gup.ub.gu.se...
-
https://doi.org/10.1...
-
visa färre...
Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- How does uncertainty about "dangerous" climate change affect the prospects for international cooperation? Climate negotiations usually are depicted as a prisoners' dilemma game; collectively, countries are better off reducing their emissions, but self-interest impels them to keep on emitting. We provide experimental evidence, grounded in an analytical framework, showing that the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold can turn climate negotiations into a coordination game, making collective action to avoid a dangerous threshold virtually assured. These results are robust to uncertainty about the impact of crossing a threshold, but uncertainty about the location of the threshold turns the game back into a prisoners' dilemma, causing cooperation to collapse. Our research explains the paradox of why countries would agree to a collective goal, aimed at reducing the risk of catastrophe, but act as if they were blind to this risk.
Ämnesord
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Nyckelord
- frequency
- emissions
- risk
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ref (ämneskategori)
- art (ämneskategori)
Hitta via bibliotek
Till lärosätets databas