Exploitation and joint action

• There is a growing philosophical interest in the concept of exploitation as well as in putatively exploitative real-world practices. However, exploitation theory remains underdeveloped in an important way. Philosophers have mainly focused on cases where one party to a transaction or relationship, A, unduly takes advantage of another party, B, in order to secure a gain for him-/herself. At the same time, they have largely ignored cases where A takes advantage of B, but the gains A extracts from B accrue not (only) to A but (also) to a third party, C. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. We distinguish between three different ways in which third parties can be involved in exploitative arrangements: (i) by non-culpably benefiting from exploitation; (ii) by culpably benefiting, without joint action; and (iii) culpably, through joint action with the exploiter. Drawing on joint action theory, we explore the relevance of this threefold distinction for the attribution of moral responsibility and blame to third parties, and defend it against potential objections. Then we argue that the distinction has important implications for the remedial duties of third-party beneficiaries of exploitation towards those who were exploited. We end by briefly highlighting the usefulness of our approach for ethical analyses of exploitative practices in the real world.

Ämnesord

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Etik (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Ethics (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Complicity

Exploitation

Joint action

Moral responsibility

Remedial duties

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