Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body

• According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of himself or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action, and does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher‐order interlocking intentions.

Ämnesord

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

group identification

intentional cooperation

joint commitment

joint intentional cooperative action

shared cooperative intention

team reasoning

Intentional cooperation

group-identification

joint intentional action

Publikations- och innehållstyp

ref (ämneskategori)

art (ämneskategori)