Team reasoning and collective moral obligation

• We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it doesn’t imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight various distinctive features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an agential perspective.

• We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents can only have a moral obligation together if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to regard their situation from the group’s perspective and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective in that it doesn’t imply that the individuals have obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight distinct features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an assumed agential perspective.

Ämnesord

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Etik (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Ethics (hsv//eng)

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Sociologi -- Socialpsykologi (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Sociology -- Social Psychology (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

collective moral obligation

group identification

we-framing

team reasoning

joint ability

agent-relativity

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art (ämneskategori)

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