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- Scherp, Joakim, 1968-
(författare)
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Alternatives to the Military State? : The Swedish Estates' reactions to Absolutist policies during the Great Northern War
- 2015
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Ingår i: Revue d'histoire Nordique. - 1778-9605. ; :18, s. 147-169
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article, the meeting of the Estates in 1710, and the policies suggested during this meeting is described. It is argued that the Estates had a different view of state and society than the absolutist regime. As an alternative to the heavily militarized state, which endeavoured to control all parts of society, the Estates suggested policies that they thought would lead to greater prosperity. This would be achieved by freeing the economy from state control, and above all by concluding peace. To solve the immediate financial problems of the Crown, a system of borrowing against guarantees from the Estates was proposed, which would have meant a financial revolution of the same kind that England had recently introduced. Steven Pincus theory of revolutions is furthermore applied to the Swedish developments, and it is argued that the state-modernization forced on Sweden by the disastrous Great Northern war lead to proposals for change both from the Estates and the Crown.
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| 2. |
- Scherp, Joakim, 1968-
(författare)
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Narrowing Dynastic Rule : Models of Governance, Social Conflict and the Hobbesian Bargain in Early Modern Sweden (1560-1718)
- 2023
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Ingår i: Dynasties and State Formation in Early Modern Europe. - Amstedam : Amsterdam University Press. - 9789463728751 - 9789048554034 ; , s. 135-164-
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When King Charles XII died in 1718, there was no legitimate successor to the throne. Why was this? The explanation that is explored in this contribution is to be found in the foundation of the royal dynasty he belonged to, the Palatinate dynasty (1654–1720). This dynasty was from the beginning designed to be limited to the male offspring of Charles X Gustav, and not to any of his close relatives. Sweden had experienced multiple conflicts between members of the dynasty during the reign of the house of Vasa (in the period 1560–1621), and the appropriate solution seemed to be to limit the royal dynasty to a minimum. Even the brother of Charles X Gustav was excluded from the dynasty. I propose that the function of the members of the dynasty ‑ dynasty formation ‑ was closely connected to the models of governance ‑ state formation ‑ employed during three different periods: the dynastic-feudal model (c. 1560–1611/1625), during which royal dukes wielded great powers; the dynastic-oligarchic model (c.1611/1625–1675), in which members of the royal family and the upper crust of the aristocracy formed an oligarchy that ruled together with the monarchs through the Council of the Realm; the absolutist-meritocratic model (c. 1675–1718) in which merit and competence decided who assisted the absolute king in governing the realm, and other members of the royal family, as well as the aristocrats, were relegated to minor roles. In analysing how the historical experience of the civil strife fed into the dynasty formation, I use the political theory of Thomas Hobbes and the prospect theory of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. I hypothesise that the fear of civil war led the Swedish political actors to prefer a single strong power centre, in the form of the monarch, at the expense of other members of the dynasty. But the immense power and wealth accumulated by the aristocracy during the dynastic-oligarchic period led to different preferences among the nobility on the one hand, and the commoners on the other. The latter hoped that members of the Palatinate dynasty could help them upend the power of the aristocracy, while the former feared exactly this outcome. This conflict permeated the negotiations in 1649 and 1650, which resulted in the proclamation of Charles Gustav and his offspring as sole heirs to the throne during the rule of Queen Christina. He was not to wield any independent power until he was put on the throne—it was solemnly proclaimed that the realm was unified under one ruler: the Queen. During the minority of Charles X Gustav’s son Charles XI, there were conflicts caused by the claims of royal persons in the form of the child king’s uncle Adolf Johan and of Christina, who had abdicated. Their claims were firmly rejected by a unified political nation once they started to use the language of power: the Crown would remain united. They were both expressly excluded from the succession to the throne, further narrowing the scope of the dynasty. When Charles XI reached maturity, he put an end to the dynastic-oligarchic model and introduced absolutism. A somewhat surprising feature of his new model of governance was the refusal to use relatives in important positions. Thus, when the head of the royal house finally got the chance to put dynasty formation into practice himself, he opted for dynastic centralisation. I hypothesise that this was a feature of a new royal ideology in which all subjects were equal in the eyes of the supreme monarch. The fulfilment of the Hobbesian ideal thus paradoxically weakened the dynasty that was supposed to produce the sovereign rulers. This weakness ultimately led to the introduction of a constitutional regime after Charles XII’s death in which the monarchs were almost powerless.
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| 3. |
- Scherp, Joakim, 1968-
(författare)
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The estates in the middle : Populist absolutism and constitutionalism in early modern Swedish politics
- 2023
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Ingår i: Parliamentarism in Northern and East-Central Europe in the Long Eighteenth Century. - London : Routledge. - 9781032071411 - 9781003205555 ; , s. 127-154
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this chapter I account for the evolution of the Swedish political system during the early modern period up to the early 1720s, with special attention to the period 1650--1723. The period was characterized by a strong growth in state power, facilitated, I argue, by the rulers’ ability to play out Commoners and Nobility against each other. But the political revolution in the years 1718-1723 meant that royal absolutism was replaced with a constitutionalist system in which the Swedish Diet, the Riksdag, ruled supreme. I claim that the reason for this change was the fact that two of the Commoner estates, the Clergy and the Burghers defected to the constitutionalist position of the Nobility. Due to their ability to ally both with the Nobility on the one hand, and the Peasantry on the other, I will refer to them collectively as ‘the middle estates’. The third commoner estate, the Peasantry, remained largely royalist, and thus kept what I will here call the populist option open to the monarchs. The rulers of Sweden could thus choose between relying on support from commoners and lesser nobles on the one hand (the populist option), and on the aristocracy through opting for constitutionalist power-sharing on the other. The emergence of constitutionalism and greater political strength in the Commoner estates during this period is illustrated by cases from the entire period.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Scherp, Joakim, 1968-
(författare)
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The peasant estate of Sweden : its rise and early modern evolution
- 2023
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Ingår i: Parliamentarism in Northern and East-Central Europe in the long eighteenth century. - London : Routledge. - 9781032071411 - 9781003205555 ; , s. 53-75
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this chapter I describe the evolution of the peasant estate of the Swedish Diet, the Riksdag, during the early modern era. First, the question of why a peasant estate arised in the Riksdag, when it is absent in virtually all other representative assemblies in premodern times. In doing so I compare Sweden with the neighbouring and culturally similar kingdom of Denmark, which briefly had peasant representation but then abolished it. In Sweden, but not in Denmark, a substantial portion of the peasantry, up to half of it, was independent of any feudal lord and dominated local politics in large parts of Sweden. There were also contingent reasons for the difference between the Scandinavian kingdoms. The contentious politics of the 1400’s and the 1500’s caused political actors to seek support from the peasants, during the former century as soldiers and during the latter as political supporters in the Riksdag. Above all, the kings sought support from the peasants against overmighty nobles. These developments had no parallel in Denmark.Second, the development of the peasant estate during the period 1617-1718 is described. During this period Sweden emerged as a great power in Northern Europe. The estate of peasants was disadvantaged by its low status, the lack of organization and its representatives’ inexperience and lack of education. Nevertheless, it was instrumental in curbing the meteoric rise of noble power during this era. And the peasant representation was highly valued by the peasants because of the possibility of presenting grievances to the king.Third, the continued evolution of the estate during the parliamentary rule of the period 1719-1772 is described. During this period, the Riksdag ruled supreme, and the political skills of the peasant representatives grew immensely. And the general peace and low taxes of the era contributed to the emergence of a rich, confident upper crust of peasant-farmers. However, they were still excluded from the most important political arena, the Secret Committee, which contributed to the widespread resentment of this system among the peasantry.At last, I discuss the legacy of the peasant estate and its importance for the political culture of modern Sweden
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| 6. |
- Scherp, Joakim, 1968-
(författare)
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The state conquers a feudal enclave : Ängsö 1690-1710
- 2021
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Ingår i: Bringing the people back in. - London : Routledge. - 9780367686963 - 9781003138662 ; , s. 215-230
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this chapter I analyze the process during which the Swedish early modern state abolished the feudal privileges of the Ängsö estate, situated in central Sweden. The privileges of the lords of Ängsö were very extensive by Swedish standards, and included judicial, clerical and fiscal advantages enjoyed by few, if any, other Swedish aristocrats. When these privileges were challenged by the Crown during the era of Caroline absolutism in the late 1600’s and early 1700’s the power relations changed dramatically on the estate. Even though the king’s officials were vested with great authority, they often needed help from subjects of Ängsö in order to claim the Crown’s rights. In some cases the confrontations were quite violent, as when the lord Sparre tried to evict the parson from the parish church of Ängsö. Nevertheless, his subjects supported their parson. The benefits for the subjects of the “conquest” seem to have been mixed, and many aspects of life on the estate stayed more or less the same.
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| 7. |
- Scherp, Joakim, 1968-
(författare)
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The Swedish Model, Early Modern Edition : Cooperation and constitutionalism in the Swedish Parliament
- 2015
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper I endeavour to explain the fact that the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, emerged the realm’s most powerful institution in the 18th century – an accomplishment only equalled by the British Parliament. I trace the roots to the success to the Riksdag of the 17th century and argue that during this century a political culture of cooperation became strongly entrenched in the assembly; furthermore I make the claim that constitutionalist ideas took roots even outside the Nobility, among the three Commoner estates (the estates of Clergy, Burghers and Peasants). It is at the same time true that the Commoners as well as the Nobility often expressed strong support for the rulers’ bids for more power. The estates were thus surprisingly flexible both with respect to with whom they cooperated, and in ideological outlook. This explains why Sweden was characterized by strong state, strong national representation, and strong rule of law. I argue that the Clergy and the Burghers played a crucial political role in the Riksdag that thwarted both royal and noble bids for supremacy. Furthermore, I compare the Swedish development with Britain’s during the same period.
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| 8. |
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