| 1. |
- Munthe, Christian, 1962, et al.
(författare)
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Person centred care and shared decision making: Implications for ethics, public health and research
- 2012
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Ingår i: Health Care Analysis. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1065-3058 .- 1573-3394. ; 20:3, s. 231-249
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper presents a systematic account of ethical issues actualised in different areas, as well as at different levels and stages of health care, by introducing organisational and other procedures that embody a shift towards person centred care and shared decision-making (PCC/SDM). The analysis builds on general ethical theory and earlier work on aspects of PCC/SDM relevant from an ethics perspective. This account leads up to a number of theoretical as well as empirical and practice oriented issues that, in view of broad advancements towards PCC/SDM, need to be considered by health care ethics researchers. Given a PCC/SDM-based reorientation of health care practice, such ethics research is essential from a quality assurance perspective.
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| 2. |
- Cutas, Daniela, 1978
(författare)
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On triparenting. Is having three committed parents better than having only two?
- 2011
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Ingår i: Journal of Medical Ethics. - : BMJ. - 1473-4257 .- 0306-6800. ; 37:12, s. 735-738
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Although research indicates that single parenting is not by itself worse for children than their being brought up by both their parents, there are reasons why it is better for children to have more than one committed parent. If having two committed parents is better, everything else being equal, than having just one, I argue that it might be even better for children to have three committed parents. There might, in addition, be further reasons why allowing triparenting would benefit children and adults, at least in some cases. Whether or not triparenting is on the whole preferable to bi- or monoparenting, it does have certain advantages (as well as shortcomings) which, at the very least, warrant its inclusion in debates over the sorts of family structures we should allow in our societies, and how many people should be accepted in them. This paper has the modest aim of scratching the surface of this wider topic by challenging the necessity of the max-two-parents framework.
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| 3. |
- Cutas, Daniela, et al.
(författare)
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Infertility, ethics, and the future : an exploration
- 2017
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Ingår i: The Palgrave handbook of infertility in history. - London : Palgrave Macmillan. - 9781137520807 - 9781137520791 ; , s. 609-624
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This chapter explores current and prospective reproductive technologies and some of their likely implications for reproductive and family ethics and policymaking. The technologies discussed include uterus transplants, mitochondrial transfer, ectogenesis, the development of in vitro gametes, and solo reproduction. The chapter considers the impact of these developments on the content of concepts such as 'infertility', 'mother', or 'father'. Another layer to this process of redefinition originates in ongoing socio-cultural changes that shift the focus in parenting from the way in which children have come into the world, to relationships within the family. Considering these scenarios beforehand can help to clarify some of the current challenges in defining and regulating infertility. The chapter therefore aims to raise a number of questions rather than provide answers.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Cutas, Daniela, et al.
(författare)
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‘Duped Fathers’, ‘Cuckoo Children’, and the Problem of Basing Fatherhood on Biology: A Philosophical Analysis
- 2020
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Ingår i: Assistierte Reproduktion mit Hilfe Dritter. - Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin/Heidelberg. - 9783662602973 - 9783662602980 ; , s. 171-182
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Who is a child’s father? Is it the man who raised her, or the one whose genes she carries—or both? WIn this chapter, we look at the view that men who have raised children they falsely believed to be ‘their own’ have been victims of a form of fraud or are ‘false fathers’. We consider the question of who has been harmed in such cases, and in what the harm consists. We use conceptual analysis, a philosophical method of investigating the use of a concept and the logical implications of its various interpretations. We devise and discuss a number of possible scenarios in which a couple (arguably) become the parents of a child. We use these scenarios to illustrate the tenuousness of the claim that we can simply rely on biology to clarify parent-child relationships. We also discuss some of the underpinnings and implications of the language in which the debate on ‘paternity fraud’ has been framed: ‘duped’ or ‘false’ fathers and ‘cuckoo children’.
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| 6. |
- Cutas, Daniela, et al.
(författare)
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"I am your mother and your father!" : in vitro derived gametes and the ethics of solo reproduction
- 2017
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Ingår i: Health Care Analysis. - : Springer. - 1065-3058 .- 1573-3394. ; 25:4, s. 354-369
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we will discuss the prospect of human reproduction achieved with gametes originating from only one person. According to statements by a minority of scientists working on the generation of gametes in vitro, it may become possible to create eggs from men’s non-reproductive cells and sperm from women’s. This would enable, at least in principle, the creation of an embryo from cells obtained from only one individual: ‘solo reproduction’. We will consider what might motivate people to reproduce in this way, and the implications that solo reproduction might have for ethics and policy. We suggest that such an innovation is unlikely to revolutionise reproduction and parenting. Indeed, in some respects it is less revolutionary than in vitro fertilisation as a whole. Furthermore, we show that solo reproduction with in vitro created gametes is not necessarily any more ethically problematic than gamete donation - and probably less so. Where appropriate, we draw parallels with the debate surrounding reproductive cloning. We note that solo reproduction may serve to perpetuate reductive geneticised accounts of reproduction, and that this may indeed be ethically questionable. However, in this it is not unique among other technologies of assisted reproduction, many of which focus on genetic transmission. It is for this reason that a ban on solo reproduction might be inconsistent with continuing to permit other kinds of reproduction that also bear the potential to strengthen attachment to a geneticised account of reproduction. Our claim is that there are at least as good reasons to pursue research towards enabling solo reproduction, and eventually to introduce solo reproduction as an option for fertility treatment, as there are to do so for other infertility related purposes.
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| 7. |
- Cutas, Daniela
(författare)
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Immortal Fetuses
- 2008
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Ingår i: Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. - : Cambridge University Press. - 0963-1801 .- 1469-2147. ; 17:3, s. 322-329
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Cutas, Daniela
(författare)
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Istoria din noi
- 2018
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Ingår i: Scena9. - : BRD Groupe Societe Generale. - 2602-0408. ; :2018 -09-12
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 10. |
- Cutas, Daniela
(författare)
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Life extension, overpopulation and the right to life : against lethal ethics
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of Medical Ethics. - : BMJ. - 0306-6800 .- 1473-4257. ; 34:9
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Some of the objections to life-extension stem from a concern with overpopulation. I will show that whether or not the overpopulation threat is realistic, arguments from overpopulation cannot ethically demand halting the quest for, nor access to, life-extension. The reason for this is that we have a right to life, which entitles us not to have meaningful life denied to us against our will and which does not allow discrimination solely on the grounds of age. If the threat of overpopulation creates a rights conflict between the right to come into existence, the right to reproduce, the right to more opportunities and space (if, indeed, these rights can be successfully defended), and the right to life, the latter ought to be given precedence.
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