| 1. |
- Sjögren Lindquist, Gabriella, 1974-, et al.
(författare)
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Testing the rationality assumption using a design difference in the TV Game-show Jeopardy
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Abstract This paper empirically investigates the rationality assumption commonly applied in economic modeling by exploiting a design difference in the game-show Jeopardy between the US and Sweden. In particular we address the assumption of individuals’ capabilities to process complex mathematical problems to find optimal strategies. The vital difference is that US contestants are given explicit information before they act, while Swedish contestants individually need to calculate the same information. Given a rationality assumption of individuals computing optimally, there should be no difference in the strategies used. However, in contrast to the rational and focal bidding behaviors found in the US, the Swedish players display no optimal behavior. Hence, when facing too complex decisions, individuals abandon optimal strategies.
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| 2. |
- Sjögren Lindquist, Gabriella, 1974-, et al.
(författare)
-
The Swedish Welfare State: The Role of Supplementary Compensations
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The Swedish welfare state has a social security system that covers many forms of incomelosses and gives a high compensation. Compensation is given for loss of income due to sickleave, parental leave, disability, work injury, unemployment and retirement at old age. Butthere are also complementing compensation systems. The most important ones are those decidedby collective agreements between unions and employer associations. They are sometimesorganized as an insurance, in other cases as an agreement that the employer should paythe compensation. There are also other forms of complements than those based on collectiveagreements, for example complementing unemployment insurances for members of unions.Even if the complements are organized in different ways, they add to the social insurances inmore or less the same way. They give an addition under the ceiling in the social insurancesystems, they give compensation over the ceiling so that they more or less eliminate theeffects of the ceiling, and they lengthen the compensation period in some cases. This meansthat the consolidated welfare state differs in a systematic way from that which is determinedby the Parliament. In this paper we describe the differences and discuss the factors thatdetermine the differences between the two welfare states – the traditional one and theconsolidated one.
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| 3. |
- Sjögren Lindquist, Gabriella, 1974-
(författare)
-
Tournaments and unfair treatment
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper introduces the negative feelings associated with the perception of being unfairly treated into a tournament model and examines the impact of these perceptions on workers’ efforts and their willingness to work overtime. The effect of unfair treatment on workers’ behavior is ambiguous in the model in that two countervailing effects arise: a negative impulsive effect and a positive strategic effect. The impulsive effect implies that workers react to the perception of being unfairly treated by reducing their level of effort. The strategic effect implies that workers raise this level in order to improve their career opportunities and thereby avoid feeling even more unfairly treated in the future. An empirical test of the model using survey data from a Swedish municipal utility shows that the overall effect is negative. This suggests that employers should consider the negative impulsive effect of unfair treatment on effort and overtime in designing contracts and determining on promotions.
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