| 1. |
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Governance, regulation and bank stability
- 2014. - 1
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Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (refereegranskat)abstract
- In order to accomplish a sounder banking industry, banks are challenged to adopt and pursue good governance practices. This challenge relates to decisions and activities conducted by top management and other inside stakeholders, but also increasingly to the collective pressures from, and evaluation measures adopted by, outside stakeholders. This book comprises a selection of high-quality research papers and provides insight into central issues such as deleveraging and other regulatory measures for strengthening bank stability. It includes empirical studies on the relationship between the board structures of banks and their financial risk-taking under extreme market conditions as well as on the financial crisis' impact on banks' lending capacity and the overall financial intermediation model. The book also includes in-depth analyses of the determinants of bank reputation and the future prospects of small banks
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| 2. |
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Financial systems, markets and institutional changes
- 2014. - 1
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Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (refereegranskat)abstract
- Financial Systems, Markets and Institutional Changes analyses and exemplifies how the financial system endogenously adjusts to institutional changes such as new technology, political tendencies, cultural differences, new business models, and government interactions. It puts particular emphasis on how different institutional settings affect firms' borrowing and how the financial crisis affected the relationship between borrowing firms and lending banks. It further increases our understanding of how efficient financial markets are formed, by addressing issues related to the globalization of the financial market, questioning whether the EMU, with its regional imbalances, is an optimal currency union, and putting new requirements on an international lender of last resort. Recent technology development, with high frequency trading, and the increased existence of Islamic banking are two further examples of institutional changes that form new actors and new markets.
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| 3. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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A Theoretical Analysis of Collusion Involving Technology Licensing under Diseconomies of Scale
- 2023
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Ingår i: B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - 2194-6124 .- 1935-1704.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study focuses on firms with cost-efficient technology that use licensing to influence product market behaviour, market prices and outputs and the resulting welfare effects. We show how licensing fees can be constructed that lead to identical collective industry outputs as under collusion while industry output is equal to or higher than that achieved under competition and sustained in equilibrium. Hence, consumers are either indifferent to firms' collusion or better off when they do collude, whereas firms (producers) are always better off due to the improved cost efficiency of integrating the new production technology. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why technology licensing is observed in highly concentrated industries characterised by significant diseconomies of scale relative to demand. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating how technology licensing involving collusion can reduce the dissipation effect and improve social welfare in oligopolistic industries. An important policy implication is that collusion involving technology licensing should not always be challenged by antitrust authorities, particularly when it does not transfer welfare from consumers to producers.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Collusion and Licensing in Oligopolies with Linear Marginal Operating Costs
- 2019
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Ingår i: Paper presented at Wolpertinger 2019 meeting in Venice Italy, August 28-31, 2019.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Oligopolistic competition is a quite common phenomenon in many industries, not least in the aviation, banking and telecom industries. In these industries, just a few firms are often dominant on the domestic markets as well as on the international arena. Not seldom, we can observe coordinated behavior between some or several of the firms in the form of, for example, alliances and/or cartels. Coordinated behavior can improve cost efficiency, prevent entry and create market power. For the firms coordinated behavior may be attractive if it increases their profit, while from the perspective of consumers collusion is of course undesirable when hampering competition. However, this is not necessarily the case. In this paper, we model and analyze coordinated behavior of competing firms in a Cournot setting. In standard models, it is assumed that firms have constant marginal operating costs and no fixed costs. We show that collusion might be beneficial from a societal standpoint when firms that operate under imperfect competition have linear marginal operating costs and fixed entry costs. Under certain conditions, coordinated firm behavior under Cournot oligopoly leads to higher industry profit and consumer welfare than uncoordinated behavior. Moreover, marginal operating costs that are sufficiently increasing in output enhance the incentives of firms to engage in technology transfer through licensing. Licensing might in some cases serve as an enforcing mechanism of coordinated behavior among innovating firms and increase the attractiveness of cartels
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| 6. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Investeringsbedömning och modern finansiell teori
- 2020
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- I boken behandlas utförligt traditionell investeringskalkylering och relaterade räntebaserade metoder och tekniker för att avgöra investeringsars lönsamhet inför investgeringsbeslut. Under devisen att investering och finansiering utgör olika sidor av samma mynt redogörs även för betydelsen av investeringars finansiering. Bokens läsare ges en gedigen grund för att förstå det finansiella systemets roll och hur investeringars värdeskapande är sammanlänkat med finansieringen. I boken demonstreras också hur kassaflödesmodeller kan tillämpas vid företagsvärdering inför beslut om att investera i enstaka aktieposter eller uppköp av hela företag. Här uppmärksammas även värdering av immateriella tillgångar, såsom patent och nya idéer.
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| 7. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Investeringsbedömning och modern finansiell teori - övningsbok med lösningar
- 2023
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Den här övningsboken kompletterar läroboken Investeringsbedömning och modern finansiell teori med såväl grundläggande som mer avancerade övningsuppgifter med utförliga lösningsförslag. Boken innehåller även lösningsförslag till övningsuppgifter i läroboken. Övningsboken innehåller över 140 övningsuppgifter och följer lärobokens struktur.
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| 8. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Market Deregulation and the Cost of Capital
- 2005
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Ingår i: The European Integration in Swedish Economic Research Conference, Mölle May 24-27, 2005.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 9. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Modelling banks’ lending and deposits using the aggregate equilibrium approach
- 2023
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Ingår i: 2023 Wolpertinger Annual Conference, August 31th - September 3rd, Finland, University of Vaasa.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We use the aggregate equilibrium approach (AEA) framework to demonstrate how different degrees of bank competition on lending and deposits markets affect market efficiency, bank profitability, and social welfare. We explain why an interbank market among banks with different costs for producing loans and deposits improves the efficiency of financial intermediation. Banks with imbalances in their loans could benefit by borrowing from banks with surplus of deposits. In the presence of an interbank market for lending and deposits, we show that banks’ aggregate profits increase without affecting the surplus of banks’ customers.
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| 10. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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Technology Transfers, �Efficiency Gains and Surplus Thresholds:�An Aggregate Equilibrium Approach Analysis
- 2023
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Ingår i: World Finance Conference, Norway August 2nd-4th 2023, University of Agder.
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- We illustrate how an aggregate equilibrium approach can be applied to analyze the efficiency gains and social welfare effects of transfers of sufficiently large, but nondrastic, technological innovations among firms in an industry characterized by diseconomies of scale. In particular, we demonstrate how the approach can be used to identify a range of intermediate cost differences between firms where technology transfer through collusion will be optimal for competing firms and the society, including thresholds for when consumers will be indifferent to whether firms in an industry compete or collude. In addition, we discuss how a per-unit royalty license fee, which is partly paid upfront for a minimum required quantity, can be used by the licensor to restrict the quantity output of the licensee(s), and ensure the stability of collusion. We suggest that this licensing contract, which has implications for policymakers and practitioners, may explain why technology transfers often occur in highly technological industries among otherwise competing firms with market power.
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