The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility

• In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.

Ämnesord

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

moral responsibility

free will

scepticism

skepticism

judgments of moral responsibility

determinism

Practical philosophy

Praktisk filosofi

praktisk filosofi

moral responsibility

skepticism

scepticism

determinism

explanation

moral psychology

Publikations- och innehållstyp

ref (ämneskategori)

art (ämneskategori)