State-Dependent Enforcement to Foster the Adoption of New Technologies

Tyck till om SwePub Sök här!

Coria, Jessica,1979Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik, Enheten för miljöekonomi,Department of Economics, Environmental Economics Unit (author)

Harrington (J Public Econ 37:29–53, 1988) shows that a suitable strategy for regulators to make enforcement more efficient is to target surveillance resources according to past compliance records. Such scheme generates enforcement leverage as non-compliance triggers greater future scrutiny increasing the expected costs of non-compliance beyond the avoidance of immediate fines. In this paper, we propose an improved transition structure for the audit framework, in which targeting is based not only on firms’ past compliance record but also on adoption of environmentally superior technologies. We show that this transition structure would not only foster the adoption of new technology but also increase deterrence by changing the composition of firms in the industry toward an increased fraction of cleaner firms that pollute and violate less.

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP Ekonomi och näringsliv Nationalekonomi hsv//swe
SOCIAL SCIENCES Economics and Business Economics hsv//eng
Imperfect compliance · State-dependent targeted enforcement · Technology adoption · Emission standards

Zhang, Xiao-Bing,1985 (author)
Göteborgs universitetInstitutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik, Enheten för miljöekonomi (creator_code:org_t)

In:Environmental and Resource Economics: Springer Science and Business Media LLC62:2, s. 359-3810924-64601573-1502

About the subject

Kungliga biblioteket hanterar dina personuppgifter i enlighet med EU:s dataskyddsförordning (2018), GDPR. Läs mer om hur det funkar här.
Så här hanterar KB dina uppgifter vid användning av denna tjänst.