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- Backes, Marvin, et al.
(författare)
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Should moral intuitionism go social?
- 2023
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Ingår i: Noûs. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0029-4624 .- 1468-0068. ; 57:4, s. 973-985
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which we take to raise some difficult normative and meta-normative questions for theorists of all stripes.
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- Eklund, Matti, 1974-
(författare)
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Alien Structure and Themes from Analytic Philosophy
- 2019
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Ingår i: Giornale di Metafisica. - 0017-0372. ; 41:1, s. 195-208
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We think of the world as consisting of objects, with properties and standing in relations. There are, to be sure, different views on what objects etc. there are, and on what their natures are. And some theorists want to subtract some elements from this picture. For example, the ontological nihilist says that there are no objects. But still, the view described is very much orthodoxy—so much orthodoxy that one may need to be reminded that the view that the world consists of objects, with properties and standing in relations is, precisely, a view. I here investigate the possibility that this view is false: that there is what may be called alien structure. And I investigate the relationship between alien structure and some important themes from the history of analytic philosophy.
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- Eklund, Matti, 1974-
(författare)
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Incoherentism and the Sorites Paradox
- 2019
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Ingår i: The Sorites Paradox. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. - 9781316615690 - 9781107163997 - 9781316730485 ; , s. 78-94
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Incoherentism about vagueness is the view that vague expressions/concepts are incoherent due to their vagueness. This chapter elaborates on what incoherentism is, and defends a particular incoherentist view. It presents an overview of important arguments for and against incoherentism. Among arguments for the view are claims that it provides an attractive account of the nature of vagueness, and of the way in which vagueness is associated with indeterminacy. Among arguments against the view are claims that it presupposes a mistaken view on semantic/conceptual competence, and that the view sits ill with how ubiquitous vagueness is. The specific view defended is compared to the views of Michael Dummett, Terence Horgan and Peter Unger.
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