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Stable matching in ...
Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
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Eriksson, K. (författare)
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- Karlander, Johan (författare)
- KTH,Numerisk analys och datalogi, NADA
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(creator_code:org_t)
- 2000
- 2000
- Engelska.
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Ingår i: Discrete Mathematics. - 0012-365X .- 1872-681X. ; 217:3-Jan, s. 135-156
- Relaterad länk:
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https://urn.kb.se/re...
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visa fler...
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https://doi.org/10.1...
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Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.
Nyckelord
- matching
- stable matching
- core
- lattice
- optimal matching
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ref (ämneskategori)
- art (ämneskategori)
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