| 1. |
- Zhao, Xiaoyun
(författare)
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On processing GPS tracking data of spatiotemporal car movements : a case study
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of Location Based Services. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1748-9725 .- 1748-9733. ; 9:4, s. 235-253
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The advancement of GPS technology has made it possible to use GPS devices as orientation and navigation tools, but also as tools to track spatiotemporal information. GPS tracking data can be broadly applied in location-based services, such as spatial distribution of the economy, transportation routing and planning, traffic management and environmental control. Therefore, knowledge of how to process the data from a standard GPS device is crucial for further use. Previous studies have considered various issues of the data processing at the time. This paper, however, aims to outline a general procedure for processing GPS tracking data. The procedure is illustrated step-by-step by the processing of real-world GPS data of car movements in Borlänge in the centre of Sweden.
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| 2. |
- Beckman, Emma, 1983-
(författare)
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Mistaken morality? : an essay on moral error theory
- 2018
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This dissertation explores arguments and questions related to moral error theory – the idea that morality inevitably involves a fundamental and serious error such that moral judgments and statements never come out true. It is suggested that the truth of error theory remains a non-negligible possibility, and that we for this reason should take a version of moral fictionalism seriously.I begin by defining error theory as the claim that moral judgments are beliefs with moral propositions as content, moral utterances are assertions of moral propositions, and no positive moral proposition is true. Second, after giving an account of J.L. Mackie’s error theory, I argue that neither Richard Joyce’s nor Jonas Olson’s argument for error theory gives us strong reasons to believe it. According to Joyce, moral discourse presupposes non-institutional desire-transcendent reasons and non-institutional categorical requirements. I challenge this claim by arguing that morality can be understood as an institution, and that the assumption that there are non-institutional moral reasons and requirements can be understood as entering pragmatically into moral conversations. According to Olson, moral discourse involves a commitment to irreducibly normative favoring relations between facts and actions. I challenge this claim by challenging Olson’s response to Stephen Finlay’s argument against absolutist accounts of moral discourse.Third, I discuss two objections to error theory, and argue that neither gives us strong reasons to reject it. According to the first objection, which is suggested by Terence Cuneo, error theory entails epistemic error theory, which has problematic consequences. After indicating some possible responses on part of the epistemic error theorist, I challenge the entailment claim by defending Hilary Kornblith’s account of epistemic reasons as hypothetical reasons. According to the second objection, error theory entails normative error theory, which cannot be believed. Although he does not defend this objection, Bart Streumer has given an argument for the unbelievability claim. I challenge Streumer’s argument by suggesting that we might have hypothetical reasons to believe normative error theory and that, properly understood, Streumer’s conclusion is not as radical as it may first appear.Fourth, I discuss what practical implications the discovery that error theory is true would have for first-order moral thinking and discourse. I argue that if this practice is overall non-morally valuable to us, we ought to revise engagement in it on the model of role-playing in live action role-playing games if we find out that error theory is true. Some have claimed that Richard Joyce’s fictionalism encounters (prima facie) problems. I argue that by incorporating the suggestion that engagement in revised moral practice is modeled on role-playing, fictionalism can escape these problems and preserve the benefits of first-order moral practice.
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| 3. |
- Berglund, Anders, 1972-
(författare)
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From Conceivability to Possibility : An Essay in Modal Epistemology
- 2005
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This study deals with the thesis that conceivability implies possibility. Confronted with alleged counterexamples to this thesis, some philosophers have turned to what may be called “idealized” or “more demanding” notions of conceivability. I argue that in turning to such notions, they have made the thesis useless to limited beings like us for attaining modal knowledge. However, in refusing to identify conceivability with demanding or idealized notions, we cannot maintain that conceivability always implies possibility. Essentially, there are two ways to proceed: to view conceivability as a mere guide to possibility, or to argue that the conceivability thesis is a local truth, i.e., a truth with respect to a certain class of statements. I defend the latter alternative. This class of statements employs concepts with respect to which doubt concerning the conceivability thesis is to be regarded as general skepticism, not as skepticism relating to the conceivability thesis itself.I proceed by outlining an interpretation of strict possibility—i.e., the kind of possibility that I take the conceivability thesis to be about—according to which modal truths depend essentially on conceptual relations, as opposed to obtaining purely in virtue of properties of things themselves. Given this account, on which both ideal conceivability and strict possibility have a conceptual ground, I argue that these notions are not only coextensional but relate to one and the same property of statements. I further argue that the impossible is unimaginable, but that it is conceivable in the sense that one can misdescribe the contents of imagination.
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| 4. |
- Gullberg, Ebba, 1977-
(författare)
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Objects and objectivity : Alternatives to mathematical realism
- 2011
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This dissertation is centered around a set of apparently conflicting intuitions that we may have about mathematics. On the one hand, we are inclined to believe that the theorems of mathematics are true. Since many of these theorems are existence assertions, it seems that if we accept them as true, we also commit ourselves to the existence of mathematical objects. On the other hand, mathematical objects are usually thought of as abstract objects that are non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. This makes it difficult to understand how we can have knowledge of them and how they can have any relevance for our mathematical theories. I begin by characterizing a realist position in the philosophy of mathematics and discussing two of the most influential arguments for that kind of view. Next, after highlighting some of the difficulties that realism faces, I look at a few alternative approaches that attempt to account for our mathematical practice without making the assumption that there exist abstract mathematical entities. More specifically, I examine the fictionalist views developed by Hartry Field, Mark Balaguer, and Stephen Yablo, respectively. A common feature of these views is that they accept that mathematics interpreted at face value is committed to the existence of abstract objects. In order to avoid this commitment, they claim that mathematics, when taken at face value, is false. I argue that the fictionalist idea of mathematics as consisting of falsehoods is counter-intuitive and that we should aim for an account that can accommodate both the intuition that mathematics is true and the intuition that the causal inertness of abstract mathematical objects makes them irrelevant to mathematical practice and mathematical knowledge. The solution that I propose is based on Rudolf Carnap's distinction between an internal and an external perspective on existence. I argue that the most reasonable interpretation of the notions of mathematical truth and existence is that they are internal to mathematics and, hence, that mathematical truth cannot be used to draw the conclusion that mathematical objects exist in an external/ontological sense.
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| 5. |
- Nilsson, Peter
(författare)
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Empathy and emotions : on the notion of empathy as emotional sharing
- 2003
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The topic of this study is a notion of empathy that is common in philosophy and in the behavioral sciences. It is here referred to as ‘the notion of empathy as emotional sharing’, and it is characterized in terms of three ideas. If a person, S, has empathy with respect to an emotion of another person, O, then (i) S experiences an emotion that is similar to an emotion that O is currently having, (ii) S’s emotion is caused, in a particular way, by the state of O or by S’s entertaining an idea of the state or situation of O, and (iii) S experiences this emotion in a way that does not entail that S is in the corresponding emotional state. The aim of the study is to clarify this notion of empathy by clarifying these three ideas and by tracing the history of their development in philosophy.The study consists of two parts. Part one contains a short and selective account of the history in Western philosophy of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing. In chapter 2 Spinoza’s theory of imitation of affects and Hume’s theory of sympathy are presented. It is argued that these theories only exemplify the second idea characteristic of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing. Chapter 3 contains presentations of Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy, and Schopenhauer’s theory of compassion. These theories are shown to exemplify the second and the third idea. In chapter 4 there are presentations of Edith Stein’s description of Einfühlung, and Max Scheler’s account of empathy and fellow-feeling. It is shown that these accounts contain explicit specifications of the third idea, and it is argued that they also exemplify the second idea.In part two, the three ideas are further clarified and the notion of empathy as emotional sharing is defined. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the main contemporary philosophical analyses of empathy. Three different views are distinguished: one that construes empathetic emotions as emotional states, one that construes them as imagined emotions, and one that construes them as off-line emotions. The first two views are criticized and rejected. The third is accepted and further developed in chapter 6, which contains a general analysis of the emotions. A distinction is made between two ways of experiencing an emotion, and it is argued that it is possible to have the affective experience characteristic of a particular kind of emotional state without being in that kind of state. In chapter 7, a definition of ‘empathy’ is proposed. This definition contains specifications of the three ideas characteristic of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing, and it shows both how the empathizer’s emotion resembles the emotion of the empathee, and how this emotion is caused and experienced.
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| 6. |
- Odenstedt, Anders
(författare)
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Cognition and Cultural Context : An Inquiry into Gadamer's Theory of Context-Dependence
- 2001
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This study deals with the problem of the context-dependence of thought, as dealt with by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). Gadamer stresses what he sees as the difficulty of bringing to awareness and criticising influences which preserve such dependence, and the role of traditions (Überlieferungen) in this regard. This study seeks to distinguish between different ways in which Gadamer's claims in this respect might be understood and to assess them.Gadamer affirms the cohesion of historical contexts, thereby arguing that it typically involves basic presuppositions (Vorurteile) that underlie seemingly divergent views in a way which is not reflected on by individuals sharing such a context. However, in opposition to this claim, it may be argued that contexts contain a shared conceptual framework, or a preoccupation with certain problems, but that they may nevertheless be heterogeneous in terms of presuppositions as such. But Gadamer holds that the cognitive heterogeneity of contexts is easily overrated insofar as common presuppositions are not questioned or even detected.A central issue of this study is the extent to which unreflected context-dependence persists in the modern era. Gadamer, while not denying that the very notion of context-dependence requires that it is at least partly reflected, argues that the scope of this reflection has been overestimated, notably by philosophers in the Enlightenment tradition; he refers to Karl Popper and Jürgen Habermas as examples of this overestimation. According to Gadamer, the current awareness of context-dependence and of, e.g., the corresponding problem of anachronism in historical study, surpasses that of previous epochs, but this difference is nevertheless a matter of degree rather than kind.In what sense is it correct to say that the very notion of unreflected context-dependence requires reflection, and that it therefore casts doubt on the claims made by Gadamer himself? According to a rather frequent objection to Gadamer, awareness of context-dependence occurs in a situation in which this dependence is reduced. Conversely, an individual subject to unreflected context-dependence would not be able to recognise his or her predicament in this respect. In this study, this objection is discussed in connection with general problems of interpretation in cultural and historical studies.
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| 7. |
- Samuelsson, Lars, 1975-
(författare)
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The moral status of nature : reasons to care for the natural world
- 2008
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former.The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them.Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.
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| 8. |
- Vaassen, Bram, 1991-
(författare)
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Causal after all : a model of mental causation for dualists
- 2019
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this dissertation, I develop and defend a model of causation that allows for dualist mental causation in worlds where the physical domain is physically complete.In Part I, I present the dualist ontology that will be assumed throughout the thesis and identify two challenges for models of mental causation within such an ontology: the exclusion worry and the common cause worry. I also argue that a proper response to these challenges requires a thoroughly lightweight account of causation, i.e. an account that allows for causes to be metaphysically distinct from the phenomena that produce or physically necessitate their effects.In Part II, I critically evaluate contemporary responses to these challenges from the philosophical literature. In particular, I discuss (i) List and Stoljar’s criticism of exclusion worries, (ii) Kroedel’s alternative dualist ontology, (iii) concerns about the notion of causal sufficiency, and (iv) Lowe’s models of dualist mental causation. I argue that none of these proposals provide independent motivation for a thoroughly lightweight account of causation and therefore leave room for improvement.In the first four chapters of Part III, I develop a thoroughly lightweight model of causation, which builds on interventionist approaches to causation. First, I explain how so-called ‘holding fixed’-requirements in standard interventionist accounts stand in the way of dualist mental causation. I then argue that interventionist accounts should impose a robustness condition on causal correlations and that, with this condition in place, the ‘holding fixed’-requirements can be weakened such that they do allow for dualist mental causation. I dub the interventionist model with such weakened ‘holding fixed’-requirements ‘insensitive interventionism’, argue that it can counter the exclusion worry as well as the common cause worry, and explain under which circumstances it would predict there to be dualist mental causation. Importantly, these circumstances might, for all we know, hold in the actual world.In the final three chapters of Part III, I defend insensitive interventionism against some objections. I consider the objection that causation must be productive, the objection that causes must (in some sense) physically necessitate their effects, and the objection that insensitive interventionism is too permissive. I respond by drawing from the literature on causation by absences and on the relation between causation and fundamental physics. Overall, insensitive interventionism performs as well as standard interventionist accounts. I conclude that insensitive interventionism is a credible model of causation.
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| 9. |
- Zheng, Bo, 1973-
(författare)
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Characterisation of the Clp Proteins in Arabidopsis thaliana
- 2003
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Unlike in the greenhouse, plants need to cope with many environmental stresses under natural conditions. Among these conditions are drought, waterlogging, excessive or too little light, high or low temperatures, UV irradiation, high soil salinity, and nutrient deficiency. These stress factors can affect many biological processes, and severely retard the growth and development of higher plants, resulting in massive losses of crop yield and wood production. Plants have developed many protective mechanisms to survive and acclimate to stresses, such as the rapid induction of specific molecular chaperones and proteases at the molecular level. Molecular chaperones mediate the correct folding and assembly of polypeptides, as well as repair damaged protein structures caused by stress, while proteases remove otherwise non-functional and potentially cytotoxic proteins. The Clp/Hsp100 family is a new group of chaperones that consists of both constitutive and stress-inducible members. Besides being important chaperones, many Clp/Hsp100 also participate in protein degradation by associating with the proteolytic subunit ClpP to form the Clp protease complex. Higher plants have the greatest number and complexity of Clp proteins than any other group of organisms, and more than 20 different Clp isomers in plants have been identified (Paper I). Because of this diversity, we have adopted a functional genomics approach to characterise all Clp proteins in the model plant Arabidopsis thaliana. Our ongoing research strategy combines genetic, biochemical and molecular approaches. Central to these has been the preparation of transgenic lines for each of the chloroplast Clp isomers. These transgenic lines will be analysed to understand the function and regulation of each chloroplast Clp protein for plant growth and development.In Paper II, an Arabidopsis thaliana cDNA was isolated that encodes a homologue of bacterial ClpX. Specific polyclonal antibodies were made and used to localise the ClpX homologue to plant mitochondria, consistent with that predicted by computer analysis of the putative transit peptide. In addition to ClpX, a nuclear-encoded ClpP protein, termed ClpP2, was identified from the numerous ClpP isomers in Arabidopsis and was also located in mitochondria. Relatively unchanged levels of transcripts for both clpX and clpP2 genes were detected in various tissues and under different growth conditions. Using β-casein as a substrate, plant mitochondria possessed an ATP-stimulated, serine-type proteolytic activity that could be strongly inhibited by antibodies specific for ClpX or ClpP2, suggesting an active ClpXP protease.In Paper III, four nuclear-encoded Clp isomers were identified in Arabidopsis thaliana: ClpC1 and ClpP3-5. All four proteins are localized within the stroma of chloroplasts, along with the previously identified ClpD, ClpP1 and ClpP6 proteins. Potential differential regulation among these Clp proteins was analysed at both the mRNA and protein level. A comparison between different tissues showed increasing amounts of all plastid Clp proteins from roots to stems to leaves. The increases in protein were mirrored at the mRNA level for most ClpP isomers but not for ClpC1, ClpC2 and ClpD and ClpP5, which exhibited little change in transcript levels. Potential stress induction was also tested for all chloroplast Clp proteins by a series of brief and prolonged stress conditions. The results reveal that these proteins, rather than being rapidly induced stress proteins, are primarily constitutive proteins that may also be involved in plant acclimation to different physiological conditions. In Paper IV, antisense repression transgenic lines of clpP4 were prepared and then later characterised. Within the various lines screened, up to 90% of ClpP4 protein content was specifically repressed, which also led to the down-regulation of ClpP3 and ClpP5 protein contents. The repression of clpP4 mRNA retarded the development of chloroplasts and the differentiation of leaf mesophyll cells, resulting in chlorotic phenotypes. The chlorosis was more severe in young than in mature leaves due likely to the developmental expression pattern of the ClpP4 protein. Chlorotic plants eventually turned green upon aging, accompanied by a recovery in the amount of the ClpP4 protein. The greening process could be affected by the light quantity, either by altering the photoperiod or light intensity.
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| 10. |
- Östlund, Sebastian, 1989-
(författare)
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Being well and doing good
- 2023
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This dissertation contains an introductory chapter and four articles. In section 1 of the introductory chapter, I provide an overview of my argument. In section 2, I do five things. First, I show that well-being is subject-relative, meaning that well-being is always present in a life if it is present at all. Second, I restrict the discussion to people as welfare subjects. Third, I describe the levels of generality that well-being theorising can take. Fourth, I show well-being’s relations to other values. Fifth, I describe the distinction between having or not having positive well-being and enduring ill-being. In section 3 of the introductory chapter, I outline the main philosophical well-being theories. I highlight their strengths and weaknesses, before moving on to section 4 where I describe the conceptual framework I use in my articles: the capability approach. The capability approach focuses on genuine opportunities, beings, and doings. The opportunities, beings, and doings can be specified in different contexts as needed. Hence, capabilitarian analyses focusing on different opportunities, beings and doings, are available. In my articles, I argue for four things regarding those well-being analyses. First, I argue that, and show how, expert opinions and public opinions can be reconciled in well-being policy-making situations. Second, I argue that, and show how, prudentially negative beings and doings should be assessed by analysing cases of homelessness. Third, I argue that the capability approach can be used to offer a complementary account to the predominant philosophical analyses of addiction which mainly focus on its descriptive nature. My complementary analysis highlights further targets for policy-making efforts. Fourth, I argue that well-being is context-sensitive. To that end, I bolster the capability approach by refining a view called contextualism. I defend this view against counterarguments and consequently both contextualism and the capability approach are made more viable.
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