| 1. |
- Alanen, Lilli, 1941-
(författare)
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Love and Objective Reality in Spinoza's Account of the Mind's Power over the Affects
- 2023
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Routledge. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 101:3, s. 517-533
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores Spinoza's therapy of passions and method of salvation through knowledge and love of God. His optimism about this method is perplexing: it is not even clear how his God, who is unlike any traditional notion of divinity, can be loved. Sorting out Spinoza's view involves distinguishing an ethics of bondage from another of freedom, and two corresponding notions of love of God. The paper argues that the highest kind of love-'pure intellectual love of God'-should not be understood as an affect at all, but instead as unimpeded intellectual activity. This suggestion requires reconsidering Spinoza's account of cognition, particularly his use of the Cartesian notions of objective and formal reality which are not only central to his theory of ideas but constitute the foundations of his salvation project.
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| 2. |
- Alm, David
(författare)
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Atomism About Value
- 2004
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 82:2, s. 312-331
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Atomism is defined as the view that the moral value of any object is ultimately determined by simple features whose contribution to the value of an object is always the same, independently of context. A morally fundamental feature, in a given context, is defined as one whose contribution in that context is determined by no other value fact. Three theses are defended, which together entail atomism: (1) All objects have their moral value ultimately in virtue of morally fundamental features; (2) If a feature is morally fundamental, then its contribution is always the same; (3) Morally fundamental features are simple.
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| 3. |
- Andrić, Vuko, et al.
(författare)
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Prioritarianism, Timeslices, and Prudential Value
- 2022
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 100:3, s. 595-604
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.
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| 4. |
- Andrić, Vuko, et al.
(författare)
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Prioritarianism, Timeslices, and Prudential Value
- 2022
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 100, s. 595-604
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.
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| 5. |
- Backes, Marvin
(författare)
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Epistemic Justification : Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory
- 2023
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Routledge. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 101:1, s. 65-81
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper puts forward a novel pluralist theory of epistemic justification that brings together two competing views in the literature-probabilistic and non-probabilistic accounts of justification. The first part of the paper motivates the new theory by arguing that neither probabilistic nor non-probabilistic accounts alone are wholly satisfactory. The second part puts forward what I call the Functional Theory of Justification. The key merit of the new theory is that it combines the most attractive features of both probabilistic and non-probabilistic accounts of justification while avoiding their most serious shortcomings. The paper also provides a blueprint for future pluralist projects in epistemology.
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| 6. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-, et al.
(författare)
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Internalists Beware – We Might all be Amoralists!
- 2013
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 91:1, s. 1-14
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Standard motivational internalism is the claim that by a priori or conceptual necessity, a psychological state is a moral opinion only if it is suitably related to moral motivation. Many philosophers, the authors of this paper included, have assumed that this claim is supported by intuitions to the effect that amoralists—people not suitably related to such motivation—lack moral opinions proper. In this paper we argue that this assumption is mistaken, seeming plausible only because defenders of standard internalism have failed to consider the possibility that our own actual moral practice as a whole is one where moral opinions fail to motivate in the relevant way. To show this, we present a cynical hypothesis according to which the tendency for people to act in accordance with their moral opinions ultimately stems from a desire to appear moral. This hypothesis is most likely false, but we argue, on both intuitive and methodological grounds, that it is conceptually possible that it correctly describes our actual moral opinions. If correct, this refutes standard motivational internalism. Further, we propose an explanation of why many have seemingly internalist intuitions. Such intuitions, we argue, stem from the fact that standard amoralist cases allow (or even suggest) that we apprehend the putative moral opinions of amoralists as radically different from how we understand actual paradigmatic moral opinions. Given this, it is reasonable to understand them as not being moral opinions proper. However, since these intuitions rest on substantial a posteriori assumptions about actual moral opinions, they provide no substantial a priori constraints on theories of moral judgment.
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| 7. |
- Blomberg, Olle
(författare)
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Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency
- 2016
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 94:2, s. 315-326
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It is thus something of a mystery why the condition is so widely accepted. By rejecting three arguments that could potentially support it, I argue that reductionists should get rid of the condition. I show that two of the arguments fail. While the third argument is intuitively compelling, it builds on key premises that are unavailable to the reductionist.
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| 8. |
- Bykvist, Krister, et al.
(författare)
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Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude : Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder
- 2017
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 95:4, s. 794-799
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.
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