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- Andén, Lovisa
(författare)
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Literature and the Expressions of Being in Merleau-Ponty’s Unpublished Course Notes
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. - : Taylor & Francis. - 0007-1773 .- 2332-0486. ; 50:3, s. 208-219
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article I examine Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the relation between literature, being and perception. I focus especially on two of Merleau-Ponty’s courses at Collège de France: the first course, Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, and the unpublished course Sur le problème de la parole. In the former Merleau-Ponty presents a new understanding of perception, according to which being is expressed in perception through the style of movement of the perceived phenomenon. In the latter he advances a notion of literary writing as an expression of the being that is itself expressed to us in perception. Through a reading of Proust’s work, he discusses how the literary writer makes his experience expressive by means of a stylization of what is experienced. Hence, literature expresses perception through an enhancement of the expressiveness that it already contains. This capacity of literature will be the main focus of my investigation.
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- Foultier, Anna Petronella
(författare)
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The First Man Speaking : Merleau-Ponty on Expression as the Task of Phenomenology
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0007-1773 .- 2332-0486. ; 46:3, s. 195-212
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article aims to establish an understanding of Merleau-Ponty's view of creative expression, and of its phenomenological function, setting out from the intriguing statement in his essay Cezanne's Doubt that the painter (or writer or philosopher) finds himself in the situation of the first human being trying to express herself. Although the importance of primary or creative expression in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is well known, there is no consensus among commentators with respect to how this notion is to be understood, and of its apparently paradoxical relation to experience in his philosophy. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty seems to presuppose that there is an original meaning pre-given in experience; on the other hand, expression is described as a hazardous enterprise, because the meaning to be expressed does not exist before expression has succeeded. In order to resolve this tension, I explore the significance of the precariousness of creative expression, arguing that it must be related to its other side: the constituted, all too often petrified meaning that we must start out from.
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| 7. |
- Odenstedt, Anders
(författare)
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Gadamer on the Limits of Reflection
- 2005
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Ingår i: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0007-1773 .- 2332-0486. ; 36:1, s. 39-54
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The notion that cognition unreflectively depends on its historical context plays a central role in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy. This paper deals with the rather frequent objection to Gadamer that a theory of unreflectiveness of the kind proposed by him reduces the very lack of reflection that it asserts. According to this objection, recognizing the limits of reflection shows that they have been overcome. Indeed, Gadamer argues that context-dependence and the presuppositions (Vorurteile) that it involves are largely unreflected. But this very argument seems to rely on a reflective stance. However, a distinction might be made between (i) a general idea of context-dependence and (ii) awareness of the specific forms of this dependence. (i) of course does not require that all contextually induced presuppositions are, or even may become, fully reflected. But Gadamer tends to argue that most contextual influences are unreflected, an argument that seems to suggest that the limits of reflection can indeed be overcome in sense (ii). This argument does not rely on a general idea of context-dependence, but requires a form of reflection which is both specific and comprehensive in order to succeed.
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| 9. |
- Odenstedt, Anders
(författare)
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Gadamer on the Limits of Reflection
- 2005
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Ingår i: The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. - 0007-1773. ; 36:1, s. 39-54
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The notion that cognition unreflectively depends on its historical context plays a central role in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy. This paper deals with the rather frequent objection to Gadamer that a theory of unreflectiveness of the kind proposed by him reduces the very lack of reflection that it asserts. According to this objection, recognizing the limits of reflection shows that they have been overcome. Thus, Gadamer argues that context-dependence and the prejudices (Vorurteile) that it involves are largely unreflected. But this very argument seems to rely on a reflective stance. However, a distinction might be made between (i) a general idea of context-dependence and (ii) awareness of the specific forms of this dependence. (i) of course does not require that all prejudices are reflected. But Gadamer tends to argue that most contextual influences are unreflected, an argument that seems to suggest that the limits of reflection can indeed be overcome in sense (ii). This argument does not rely on a general idea of context-dependence, but invokes a form of reflection which is both specific and comprehensive.
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