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- Juthe, Andre
(författare)
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THE BOUNDARY THEORY OF LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL
- 2023
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Ingår i: Review of Metaphysics. - : Project MUSE. - 0034-6632 .- 2154-1302. ; 77:2, s. 327-343
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The first purpose of this article is to present a new theory of libertarian free will—the boundary theory of libertarian free will—which provides a new framework by means of employing boundaries as a “conceptual scheme” for understanding libertarian free will. This theory consists of two parts. One part suggests that the agent’s will should be viewed as the intermediate boundary between an agent’s reasons and his alternative choices. The second part is a model where the agent’s will is a faculty that solely operates by permitting or resisting reasons (that are potential causes) to become actual causes for the agent’s choices. The second purpose of the paper is to argue that the boundary theory of libertarian free will has several advantages, the most important of which are: (a) it defeats the charge that libertarian free will is a mystery; (b) it defeats the standard objections against the compatibility of libertarian free will and indeterminism (that is, the luck argument, the roll-back argument, the difference argument, the assimilation argument, etc.); and (c) it is simultaneously an argument for indeterminism as such (that is, that determinism is false).
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| 2. |
- Odenstedt, Anders
(författare)
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Gadamer on Context-Dependence
- 2003
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Ingår i: Review of Metaphysics. - 0034-6632 .- 2154-1302. ; 57:1, s. 75-104
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper deals with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s theory of the way in which cognition depends on its historical context. In section I and II the historical background of this theory is briefly described. In section III Gadamer’s claim that context-dependence involves unreflected presuppositions (Vorurteile) is discussed; throughout the paper, different senses of this claim are distinguished. Section IV examines Gadamer's corresponding claim that these presuppositions are of a general kind, with the result that the manifold of seemingly opposed and more specific views which rely on them is overrated by individuals sharing a historical context.
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| 3. |
- Stöpfgeshoff, Alexander, et al.
(författare)
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Thomas Aquinas on the Virtues of Character and Virtuous Ends
- 2020
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Ingår i: Review of Metaphysics. - : Project Muse. - 0034-6632 .- 2154-1302. ; 74:1, s. 21-41
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Thomas Aquinas situates virtues of character in the noncognitive appetite. He also claims that virtues of character provide the ends in practical matters. Since providing proper ends seems to be a cognitive act, it is unclear how virtues of character, qua perfections of the noncognitive appetite, provide ends. After criticizing three approaches to this interpretive challenge, we suggest that Aquinas provides us with a theory of practical identity. We argue that that on Aquinas's view a practical identity is constituted both by a virtuous disposition in the appetitive power and by a rational commitment to proximate ends, a rational commitment that results from acquiring the virtuous disposition. With this account of practical identity in mind, we explain how Aquinas can consistently claim that virtues, qua perfections of the appetite, provide ends.
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| 4. |
- Särman, Sanja
(författare)
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Essence, Existence, and Being : An Inconsistency in Spinoza’s Metaphysics?
- 2023
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Ingår i: Review of Metaphysics. - : The Philosophy Education Society, Inc.. - 0034-6632 .- 2154-1302. ; 77:1, s. 29-55
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The author explores whether Spinoza can consistently maintain two doctrines which he espouses in his Ethics. The first doctrine is the equivalence between perfection, reality, being, and essence. The second doctrine is the Metaphysical Difference between that in which essence and existence are identical (God) and those things for which essence and existence are distinct (everything but God). The article is structured as follows. First, the author shows that these two key doctrines apparently clash. Second, she shows two ways in which this clash can be avoided. The first way consists in drawing a line between mere being and existence. This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called “Platonist” in the secondary literature. The second way consists in denying that the Metaphysical Difference cuts reality at its joints. Instead, the Metaphysical Difference, on this reading, differentiates between appearances (those things in which essence and existence come apart) and reality (that thing in which they are one). This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called Eleatic in the secondary literature. The author concludes by suggesting that, if the Spinozist rejects both the Eleatic and the Platonist approach, she is obliged to find another way to salvage her system.
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