| 1. |
- Blomberg, Olle
(författare)
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We-experiences, common knowledge and the mode approach to collective intentionality
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Social Philosophy. - : Wiley. - 1467-9833 .- 0047-2786. ; 49:1, s. 183-203
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a “we-experience”—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject “as ours” rather than merely “as my experience” (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemanding way. Galotti and Frith (2013) and Schmitz (2017) present we-mode accounts that are supposed to, in particular, avoid the need for the subjects of experience to have common knowledge of each other’s perceptual beliefs. In this paper, drawing in part on Schutz’s (1932/1967; 1953) writings on “the pure We-relationship”, I argue that appeal to a we-mode does not render common knowledge unnecessary. To explain when we-experiences are veridical, we-mode accounts must (i) explain how a we-experience can enable rational interpersonal coordination in some high-risk situations and (ii) explain why what is experienced is “out in the open” between the subjects of the we-experience. To do this, proponents of we-mode accounts need an account of common knowledge. In addition, they must specify which inferences hold between we-mode and I-mode attitudes, and explain why these inferences hold. In light of this, we-mode accounts fare no better than content accounts in illuminating how basic forms of collective intentionality are possible.
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| 2. |
- Furendal, Markus, 1989-
(författare)
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Tying Ourselves to the Mast, or Acting for the Sake of Justice? Ethos, Individual Duties, and Social Sanctions
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of social philosophy. - : Wiley. - 0047-2786 .- 1467-9833.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many contemporary political movements focus more on changing the values and principles that people act on in their daily lives rather than institutions and legal frameworks. Political-philosophical theories of justice, however, often focus more on the Rawlsian “basic structure” than the “ethos” of a just society, and rarely discuss how individuals may be encouraged to act in accordance with principles of justice. This article attempts to redress this, and draws on moral, social and political philosophy to argue that an ethos exists in a group or society either i) when its members internalize and act from a particular principle, or ii) when its members uphold a decentralized system of informal social sanctions that increases their compliance with a particular principle.
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| 3. |
- Gheaus, Anca, 1974-, et al.
(författare)
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The goods of work (other than money!)
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of social philosophy. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0047-2786 .- 1467-9833. ; 47:1, s. 70-89
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The evaluation of labour markets and of particular jobs ought to be sensitive to a plurality of benefits and burdens of work. We use the term 'the goods of work' to refer to those benefits of work that cannot be obtained in exchange for money and that can be enjoyed mostly or exclusively in the context of work. Drawing on empirical research and various philosophical traditions of thinking about work we identify four goods of work: 1) attaining various types of excellence; 2) making a social contribution; 3) experiencing community; and 4) gaining social recognition. Our account of the goods of work can be read as unpacking the ways in which work can be meaningful. The distribution of the goods of work is a concern of justice for two conjoint reasons: First, they are part of the conception of the good of a large number of individuals. Second, in societies without an unconditional income and in which most people are not independently wealthy, paid work is non-optional and workers have few, if any, occasions to realize these goods outside their job. Taking into account the plurality of the goods of work and their importance for justice challenges the theoretical and political status quo, which focuses mostly on justice with regard to the distribution of income. We defend this account against the libertarian challenge that a free labour market gives individuals sufficient options to realise the goods of work important to them, and discuss the challenge from state neutrality. In the conclusion, we hint towards possible implications for today's labour markets.
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| 4. |
- Malmqvist, Erik, et al.
(författare)
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Exploitation and joint action
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of social philosophy. - : Wiley. - 0047-2786 .- 1467-9833. ; 50:3, s. 280-300
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- There is a growing philosophical interest in the concept of exploitation as well as in putatively exploitative real-world practices. However, exploitation theory remains underdeveloped in an important way. Philosophers have mainly focused on cases where one party to a transaction or relationship, A, unduly takes advantage of another party, B, in order to secure a gain for him-/herself. At the same time, they have largely ignored cases where A takes advantage of B, but the gains A extracts from B accrue not (only) to A but (also) to a third party, C. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. We distinguish between three different ways in which third parties can be involved in exploitative arrangements: (i) by non-culpably benefiting from exploitation; (ii) by culpably benefiting, without joint action; and (iii) culpably, through joint action with the exploiter. Drawing on joint action theory, we explore the relevance of this threefold distinction for the attribution of moral responsibility and blame to third parties, and defend it against potential objections. Then we argue that the distinction has important implications for the remedial duties of third-party beneficiaries of exploitation towards those who were exploited. We end by briefly highlighting the usefulness of our approach for ethical analyses of exploitative practices in the real world.
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