| 1. |
- Agnafors, Marcus
(författare)
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Mixing Interest and Control? : Assessing Peter Vallentyne’s Hybrid Theory of Rights
- 2015
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 43:4, s. 933-949
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The relationship between libertarianism and state is a contested one. Despite pressing full and strict ownership of one’s person and any justly acquired goods, many libertarians have suggested ways in which a state, albeit limited, can be regarded as just. Peter Vallentyne has proposed that all plausible versions of libertarianism are compatible with what he calls ‘private-law states’. His proposal is underpinned by a particular conception of rights, which brings Interest Theory of rights and Will Theory of rights together. If convincing, Vallentyne’s theory of rights enables libertarians to accommodate a limited but nevertheless coercive state that can act without the full consent of the affected citizen. In this paper, it is argued that Vallentyne’s hybrid theory of rights is implausible from a libertarian perspective as well as fails to align itself with common and deeply held moral intuitions. Hence the conflict between mainstream libertarianism and the state is not solved by Vallentyne’s proposal.
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| 2. |
- Bülow, William
(författare)
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Felon Disenfranchisement and the Argument from Democratic Self-Determination
- 2016
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Netherlands. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 44:3, s. 759-774
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper discusses an argument in defense of felon disenfranchisement originally proposed by Andrew Altman, which states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, members of a legitimate democratic community have a collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons. Although this argument-which is here referred to as the argument from democratic self-determination-is held to justify policies that are significantly broader in scope than many critics of existing disenfranchisement practices would allow for, it has received little attention from philosophers and political theorists. One exception is Claudio Lpez-Guerra, who recently raised several objections to the argument. In this paper, I argue that the argument from democratic self-determination can avoid Lpez-Guerra's objections. In responding to these, I explicate how and when it can be permissible for a legitimate democratic community to disenfranchise felons. I propose that this is the case only if the disenfranchisement of felons is not intended as a punishment, but as a way to express the view about citizenship one endorses as a democratic collective. I also discuss the implications of the argument in terms of offender reintegration.
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| 3. |
- Båve, Arvid
(författare)
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Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns : a Reply to Salis
- 2019
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:5, s. 1421-1429
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- I here respond to Pietro Salis's objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT). In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and general semantic notions like equivalence, consequence, and sameness of content, and make some further points about (PT)'s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of true.
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| 4. |
- Carlson, Erik, 1961-
(författare)
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A Refutation of Spectrum Arguments for Nontransitive Betterness
- 2023
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 51:4, s. 2147-2150
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This short paper states a new objection against "spectrum arguments" for nontransitive betterness. It is shown that defenders of such arguments must reject one of two very plausible principles.
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| 5. |
- Carlson, Erik, 1961-, et al.
(författare)
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Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness
- 2024
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In a recent article in this journal, John Martin Fischer defends the view that death harms its victim after she dies. More specifically, he develops a “truthmaking” account in order to solve what he calls the Problem of Predication for this view. In this reply, we argue that Fischer’s proposed solution to this problem is unsuccessful.
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| 6. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
(författare)
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Being Clear on Content - Commentary on Hutto and Satne
- 2015
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 43:3, s. 687-699
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the target article Hutto and Satne propose a new approach to studying mental content. Although I believe there is much to commend in their proposal, I argue that it makes no space for a kind of content that is of central importance to cognitive science, and which need not be involved in beliefs and desires: I will use the expression ‘representational content’ to refer to it. Neglecting representational content leads to an undue limitation of the contribution that the neo-Cartesian approach can offer to the naturalising content project. I claim that neo-Cartesians can, on the one hand, help account for the nature of representational content and clarify what makes representational states contentful. On the other, besides explaining the natural origins of Ur-intentionality, neo-Cartesians should also take the role of accounting for the natural origins of contentful states that fall short of beliefs and desires. Finally, I argue that the only alternative for the authors is to embrace some form of non-representationalism, as Hutto elsewhere does. The success of the proposal thereby turns on the fate of the radical non-representationalist position that it accompanies.
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| 7. |
- de Fine Licht, Karl, 1979, et al.
(författare)
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On Defining "Reliance" and "Trust": Purposes, Conditions of Adequacy, and New Definitions
- 2021
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 49, s. 1981-2001
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Trust is often perceived as having great value. For example, there is a strong belief that trust will bring different sorts of public goods and help us preserve common resources. A related concept which is just as important, but perhaps not explicitly discussed to the same extent as "trust", is "reliance" or "confidence". To be able to rely on some agent is often seen as a prerequisite for being able to trust this agent. Up to now, the conceptual discussion about the definition of trust and reliance has been rational in the sense that most people involved have offered arguments for their respective views, or against competing views. While these arguments rely on some criterion or other, these criteria are rarely explicitly stated, and to our knowledge, no systematic account of such criteria has been offered. In this paper we give an account of what criteria we should use to assess tentative definitions of "trust" and "reliance". We will also offer our own well-founded definitions of "trust" and "reliance". Trust should be regarded as a kind of reliance and we defend what we call "the accountability view" of trust, by appealing to the desiderata we identify in the first parts of the paper.
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| 8. |
- Eriksson, John, 1973, et al.
(författare)
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Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible
- 2021
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 49, s. 1753-1766
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Richard Rowland has recently argued that considerations based on moral disagreement between epistemic peers give us reason to think that cognitivism about moral judgments, i.e., the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, is false. The novelty of Rowland's argument is to tweak the problem descriptively, i.e., not focusing on what one ought to do, but on what disputants actually do in the light of peer disagreement. The basic idea is that moral peer disagreement is intelligible. However, if moral judgments were beliefs, and beliefs track perceived evidence, then moral peer disagreement would not be intelligible. Hence, moral judgments are not beliefs. The argument is both novel and interesting, but this paper argues that it fails to establish the conclusion. Beliefs are plausibly analyzed as constituted by dispositions to respond to what is perceived as evidence, but dispositions can always be interfered with. Provided a background explanation of why the disposition is not manifested, peer intransigence is quite intelligible.
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| 9. |
- Gamper, Johan
(författare)
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On a Loophole in Causal Closure
- 2017
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 45:2, s. 631-636
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure is linked to the principle that no cause of another universe causes an event in a particular universe. This view permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. An interface between universes can be seen as a domain that violates the suggested account of causal closure, suggesting a view in which universes are causally closed whereas interfaces are not. On this basis, universes are not affected by other universes directly but rather indirectly. © 2017 The Author(s)
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| 10. |
- Garcia, Andrés G.
(författare)
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The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way
- 2019
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:3, s. 681-692
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.
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