| 1. |
- Grill, Kalle, 1976-
(författare)
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Procreation vs. consumption : harms and benefits
- 2023
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Ingår i: Environmental Ethics. - : Philosophy Documentation Center. - 0163-4275 .- 2153-7895. ; 45:3, s. 265-286
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recently, it has been argued by several scholars that we have moral reasons to limit our procreation due to the harmful environmental consequences it entails. These calls for procreative restraint are typically made in relation to other lifestyle choices, such as minimizing driving and air travel. In such comparisons, it is assumed that the environmental impact of procreation encompasses the lifetime consumption of the child created, and potentially that of further descendants. After an overview of these arguments, I go on to provide an examination of the main benefits of procreation, in relation to those of consumption, i.e., other lifestyle choices. My normative assumption is that benefits hold moral relevance, alongside harms. Procreation may benefit procreators and may provide more collective benefits. Some benefits tend to preempt the environmental impact associated with procreation. I conclude that the benefits of procreation are substantial and typically greater than those of consumption.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Samuelsson, Lars, 1975-
(författare)
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A response to Rut Vinterkvist
- 2024
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Ingår i: Environmental Ethics. - : Environmental Philosophy. - 0163-4275 .- 2153-7895. ; 46:1, s. 95-97
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In a reply to my recent paper “The Cost of Denying Intrinsic Value in Nature,” Rut Vinterkvist raises an important objection to my claim that environmentalists must ascribe intrinsic value to some natural entities to consistently defend the protectionist views I believe many of them have. To defend this claim, I provided three hypothetical cases, involving threatened natural entities, designed to show that only an intrinsic value of these respective entities could explain a reason to protect them. My claim was that, even in these cases, environmentalists would generally find the natural entities in question protection-worthy. Against this claim, Vinterkvist argues that environmentalists can consistently opt for protection of these entities without ascribing any intrinsic value to them, the idea being that we can argue for protection of the entities on the basis that other people care for them (for whatever reasons, if any). We should protect them, not for their own sake, but for the sake of those who care for them. In this response, I explain why I believe her suggestion—challenging to my argument as it is—does not provide a proper option for environmentalists who want to argue for protection in these and similar cases.
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| 4. |
- Samuelsson, Lars, 1975-
(författare)
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Environmental pragmatism and environmental philosophy : a bad marriage!
- 2010
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Ingår i: Environmental Ethics. - Denton : Environmental Philosophy, Inc.. - 0163-4275 .- 2153-7895. ; 32:4, s. 405-415
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Environmental pragmatists have presented environmental pragmatism as a new philosophical position, arguing that theoretical debates in environmental philosophy are hindering the ability of the environmental movement to forge agreement on basic policy imperatives. Hence, they aim to lead environmental philosophers away from such theoretical debates, and toward more practical—and pragmatically motivated—ones. However, a position with such an aim is not a proper philosophical position at all, given that philosophy (among other things) is an effort to get clear on the problems that puzzle us.
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| 5. |
- Samuelsson, Lars, 1975-
(författare)
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On the demarcation problem and the possibility of environmental ethics : a refutation of "A refutation of environmental ethics"
- 2010
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Ingår i: Environmental Ethics. - Denton : Environmental Philosophy, Inc.. - 0163-4275 .- 2153-7895. ; 32:3, s. 247-265
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to a popular critique of environmental ethics, the view that nature has intrinsic value faces an insurmountable demarcation problem. This critique was delivered in a particularly forceful manner two decades ago by Janna Thompson in her paper “A Refutation of Environmental Ethics.” However, the demarcation problem, albeit a real problem, is not insurmountable. Thompson’s argument draws on the claim that the possibility of environmental ethics depends on the possibility that nature can be demarcated with respect to some allegedly morally significant property or set of properties. Her own view of nature’s moral significance is equally dependent on that possibility. Therefore, if the demarcation problem were insurmountable, that would imply a refutation of her own view on nature’s moral significance as well.
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| 6. |
- Samuelsson, Lars, 1975-
(författare)
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The cost of denying intrinsic value in nature
- 2022
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Ingår i: Environmental Ethics. - : Philosophy Documentation Center. - 0163-4275 .- 2153-7895. ; 44:3, s. 267-288
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many people who claim to genuinely care about nature still seem reluctant to ascribe intrinsic value to it. Environmentalists, nature friendly people in general, and even environmental activists, often hesitate at the idea that nature possesses value in its own right - value that is not reducible to its importance to human or other sentient beings. One crucial explanation of this reluctance is probably the thought that such value - at least when attached to nature - would be mysterious in one way or another, or at least very difficult to account for. In addition, Bryan Norton’s influential convergence hypothesis states that, from a practical point of view, it makes no or little difference whether we ascribe intrinsic value to nature, given the depth and variety of instrumental value it possesses. In this paper, I argue that people who genuinely care about nature cannot avoid ascribing intrinsic value (in a certain sense) to it, if they want to be able to consistently defend the kind of claims about protecting nature they arguably want to make, i.e., claims to the effect that we ought to protect for instance nature areas and species. The cost of denying intrinsic value in nature is the cost of giving up a crucial resource to philosophically defend such claims.
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| 8. |
- Sandin, Per
(författare)
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Naturalness and de minimis risk
- 2005
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Ingår i: Environmental Ethics. - : Philosophy Documentation Center. - 0163-4275 .- 2153-7895. ; 27:2, s. 191-200
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In risk management, de minimis risk is the idea that risks that are sufficiently small, in terms of probabilities, ought to be disregarded. In the context of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, this paper examines one suggested way of determining how small risks ought to be disregarded, specifically, the natural-occurrence view of de minimis, which has been proposed by Alvin M. Weinberg, among others. It is based on the idea that "natural" background levels of risk should be used as benchmarks and de minimis levels should be derived from those levels. This approach fails even if the doubtful distinction between what is natural and what is not can be upheld.
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