| 1. |
- Ahlström, Kristoffer, 1980
(författare)
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Epistemology and Empirical Investigation
- 2007
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien. - 0165-9227. ; 76:1, s. 109-124
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recently, Hilary Kornblith has argued that epistemological investigation is substantially empirical. In the present paper, I will first show that his claim is not contingent upon the further and, admittedly, controversial assumption that all objects of epistemological investigation are natural kinds. Then, I will argue that, contrary to what Kornblith seems to assume, this methodological contention does not imply that there is no need for attending to our epistemic concepts in epistemology. Understanding the make-up of our concepts and, in particular, the purposes they fill, is necessary for a proper acknowledgment of epistemology’s role in conceptual improvement.
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| 2. |
- Almang, Jan
(författare)
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The impoverished representations of brains in vats
- 2020
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien. - : Brill Academic Publishers. - 0165-9227 .- 1875-6735. ; 97:3, s. 475-494
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article, the notion that brains in vats with perceptual experiences of the same type as ours could perceptually represent other entities than shapes is challenged. Whereas it is often held that perceptual experiences with the same phenomenal character as ours could represent computational properties, the present author argues that this is not the case for shapes. His argument is in brief that the phenomenal character of a normal visual experience exemplifies shapes - phenomenal shapes - which functions as the vehicle for our perceptual representation of shapes. Due to the unique mereological structure of shapes, phenomenal shapes are unable to reliably track any property but shapes. In so far as reliable tracking is a necessary condition for perceptual representation, phenomenal shapes can consequently and contrary to received wisdom only represent shapes.
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| 3. |
- Almäng, Jan, 1976
(författare)
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Perceiving Exploding Tropes
- 2016
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien. - : Brill. - 0165-9227 .- 1875-6735. ; 93:1, s. 42-62
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The topic of this paper is the perception of properties. It is argued that the perception of properties allows for a distinction between the sense of the identity and the sense of the qualitative nature of a property. So, for example, we might perceive a property as being identical over time even though it is presented as more and more determinate. Thus, you might see an object first as red and then as crimson red. In this case, the property is perceived as identical over time, even though the sense of the qualitative nature ( the redness, the crimson redness) of the property is changing. The distinction between the sense of identity and the sense of quality is explicated in terms of perceiving a particular property, a trope, and perceiving it as an instance of a universal. It is subsequently argued that the perceived tropes cannot constitute the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience.
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| 4. |
- Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-
(författare)
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Analyticity and Implicit Definition
- 2003
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien. - Amsterdam : Rodopi. - 0165-9227 .- 1875-6735. ; 66, s. 37-60
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 5. |
- Johansson, Ingvar
(författare)
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Collections as one-and-many—on the nature of numbers
- 2015
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien. - : BRILL ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS. - 0165-9227 .- 1875-6735. ; 91:1, s. 17-58
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Peter Simons has been rather alone in the modern philosophy of mathematics to argue that the natural numbers should be regarded as properties of multitudes or collections. This paper, however, sides with Simons, but it modifies his property view by adding the notion of imposed collection boundaries and accepting fictional collections. Although partly inspired by the Husserl of Philosophy of Arithmetic, Simons dismisses Husserl's talk of psychological acts of collective combination, but this paper saves them by dressing them in modern cognitive clothes. Hereby, a reasonable partially constructivist notion of the natural numbers emerges.
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| 6. |
- Mousavian, Seyed N., 1976
(författare)
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Ontological Trivialism? How to Meinong a Carnap-Quine
- 2017
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien. - : Brill. - 0165-9227 .- 1875-6735. ; 94:1-2, s. 38-68
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- How hard is it to answer an ontological question? Ontological trivialism, (ot), inspired by Carnap’s internal-external distinction among “questions of existence”, replies “very easy.” According to (ot), almost every ontologically disputed entity trivially exists. (ot) has been defended by many, including Schiffer (1996; 2003; 2006) and Schaffer (2009). In this paper, I will take issue with (ot). After introducing the view in the context of Carnap-Quine dispute and presenting two arguments for it, I will discuss Hofweber’s (2005a; 2007) argument against (ot) and explain why it fails. Next, I will introduce a modified version of ontological trivialism, i.e. negative ontological trivialism, (not), defended by Hofweber (2005a), according to which some ontologically disputed entities, e.g. properties, (almost) trivially do not exist. I will show that (not) fails too. Then I will outline a Meinongian answer to the original question, namely, ‘How hard is it to answer an ontological question?’ The Carnapian intuition of the triviality of internal questions can be saved by the Meinongian proposal that quantification and reference are not ontologically committing and the Quinean intuition of the legitimacy of interesting ontological questions can be respected by the Meinongian distinction between being and so-being.
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| 7. |
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| 8. |
- Sjölin Wirling, Ylwa
(författare)
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Non-uniformism and the Epistemology of Philosophically Interesting Modal Claims
- 2021
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy. - : Brill. - 0165-9227. ; 98:4, s. 629-656
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Philosophers often make exotic-sounding modal claims, such as: "A timeless world is impossible", "The laws of physics could have been different from what they are", "There could have been an additional phenomenal colour". Otherwise popular empiricist modal epistemologies in the contemporary literature cannot account for whatever epistemic justification we might have for making such modal claims. Those who do not, as a result of this, endorse scepticism with respect to their epistemic status typically suggest that they can be justified but have yet to develop some distinct, workable theory of how. That is, they endorse a form of non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality, according to which claims about philosophically interesting modal matters need to be justified differently from e.g. everyday or scientific modal claims, but they fail to provide any more detail. This article aims to fill this gap by outlining how such a non-uniformist view could be spelled out and what story about philosophically interesting modal justification it could contain.
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| 9. |
- Stokke, Andreas
(författare)
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Truthfulness and Gricean Cooperation
- 2016
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Ingår i: Grazer Philosophische Studien. - : Brill. - 0165-9227 .- 1875-6735. ; 93:3, s. 489-510
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper examines the Gricean view that quality maxims take priority over other conversational maxims. It is shown that Gricean conversational implicatures are routinely inferred from utterances that are recognized to be untruthful. It is argued that this observation falsifies Grice's original claim that hearers assume that speakers are obeying other maxims only if the speaker is assumed to be obeying quality maxims, and furthermore the related claim that hearers assume that speakers are being cooperative only to the extent that they assume they are being truthful.
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