| 1. |
- Asplund, Marcus
(författare)
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Risk-averse firms in oligopoly
- 2002
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - 0167-7187 .- 1873-7986. ; 20:7, s. 995-1012
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Does risk aversion lead to softer or fiercer competition? This paper provides a framework that accommodates a wide range of alternative assumptions regarding the nature of competition and types of uncertainty. It shows how risk aversion influences firms' best-response strategies. Only in the case of marginal cost uncertainty does higher risk aversion make competition unambiguously softer. The risk-averse best response strategies depend on the level of fixed costs. This fact is used to analyse strategic investments in capacity and the importance of accumulated profits. The paper concludes with a discussion of ways of empirically testing for risk-averse behaviour in oligopoly.
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| 4. |
- Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 1952-
(författare)
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Allocation of track capacity : Experimental Evidence on the Use of Priority Auctioning in the Railway Industry
- 1999
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-7187 .- 1873-7986. ; 17:8, s. 1139-1162
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Allocation of track capacity concerns multiple users facing demand indivisibilities, running trains over an inelastic supply of railway tracks. The paper suggests a Vickrey-type mechanism to handle incentive aspects of this technically complex optimisation task. Here, the price for operating a train will correspond to the bids foregone by other operators who are pushed off their preferred routes. The paper reports the results of 11 experimental markets using variations of this mechanism where each market includes up to 10 trading periods, and subjects bid for routes over a highly stylised railway network. The experiments generated solutions that capture 90–100% of potential benefits.
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| 5. |
- Nyberg, Sten, 1962-
(författare)
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Reciprocal shareholding and takeover deterrence
- 1995
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-7187 .- 1873-7986. ; 13:3, s. 355-372
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Reciprocal shareholding has been argued to increase managerial power and facilitate takeover resistance. The latter may translate into higher premiums in the event of an actual takeover, thus benefiting shareholders, whereas increased influence over board decisions induces too high managerial compensation. The net effect is determined by the efficiency of the incumbent management relative to outside entrepreneurs. If the probability of receiving a tender offer is high, shareholders are likely to benefit from crosswise shareholdings. While symmetric increases in crosswise shareholdings unambiguously make takeovers more difficult, it is not true' that the effect on managerial compensation is always positive. The remuneration can be shown to be initially increasing but eventually it will decrease, approaching a lower bound.
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| 6. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games
- 2010
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-7187 .- 1873-7986. ; 28:5, s. 477-495
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are asymmetric, since asymmetries provide a tacit coordination cue used by experienced players (as a substitute to communication). It is also shown that although communication is used both to achieve market domination equilibria and cooperative market separating equilibria, the latter type of communication is much more common and successful.
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| 7. |
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| 8. |
- Bergman, Mats, 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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An econometric analysis of the european commission’s merger decisions
- 2005
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-7187 .- 1873-7986. ; 23:9/10, s. 717-737
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the European Commission and logit regression techniques, we analyse the Commission's decision process. We find that the probability of a phase-2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties' market shares. The probabilities increase also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that the post-merger market structure is conducive to collusion. We do not find significant effects of “political” variables, such as the nationality of the merging firm.
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| 9. |
- Creane, Anthony, et al.
(författare)
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Informative advertising in monopolistically competitive markets
- 2022
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-7187 .- 1873-7986. ; 83
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Firms spend a half-trillion dollars advertising each year. To model and examine the welfare effects of advertising with heterogeneous goods Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model informative advertising in monopolistic competition find that informative advertising is socially excessive for large numbers of sellers. However, it has been noted that their equilibrium may not exist. We present a tractable model of informative advertising in monopolistic competition replacing the standard assumption of a finite number of firms with a continuum of firms. We derive conditions for equilibrium existence and find that in the monopolistically-competitive model, informative advertising is socially insufficient. We also find that with free entry, the measure of the set of active firms is lower than the socially optimal one. The comparison of our results with the results of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) also shows that a pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium typically does not exist in the latter model if the number of sellers is large, a fact which accounts for the different conclusions drawn in the two papers.
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| 10. |
- Enache, Andreea, et al.
(författare)
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Demand for in-app purchases in mobile apps – A difference-in-difference approach Journal Pre-proof Demand for in-app purchases in mobile apps – A difference-in-difference approach
- 2023
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Ingår i: International Journal of Industrial Organization. - : Elsevier B.V.. - 1873-7986 .- 0167-7187. ; 88
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Using five "freemium" mobile app games on six European markets we examine the effect of price changes on conversion rate, number of users and viewing of rewarded videos. Our difference-in-difference estimation relies on games being available on both the Apple and Google platforms with price changes on only one platform. Our main identification comes from exogenous adjustments of Apples prices in 2021. Own-price elasticities of conversion are in the -1 to -4 range. Watching of rewarded videos decreases as in-app prices decrease with an average elasticity of around.5, but overall play is not affected by changes in in-app prices.
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