| 1. |
- Gerdtham, U. G., et al.
(författare)
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The demand for health : Results from new measures of health capital
- 1999
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - : Elsevier B.V. - 0176-2680 .- 1873-5703. ; 15:3, s. 501-521
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper estimates a "Grossman" model of demand for health. We measure health status on a 0 (dead) to 1 (full health) cardinal scale by the rating scale method and the time trade-off method. We also use a categorical measure of overall health status commonly used in quality of life measurements. To estimate the demand for health equations, the Tobit technique is used for the rating scale and time trade-off health measure. The ordered probit model is used for the categorical health measure. The demand for health decreases with the price of medical care, age, overweight, smoking and living alone, and increases with income, education and the level of sporting activities.
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| 2. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Growth and the public sector : A reply
- 1999
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - 0176-2680 .- 1873-5703. ; 15:2, s. 359-366
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Fölster and Henrekson [Fölster, S., Henrekson, M., 1999. Growth and the public sector: A critique of the critics. European Journal of Political Economy 15, 337–358] claim that, by addressing a number of econometric problems, they can establish that it is likely that economies with a large public sector grow more slowly than economies with a small public sector. But their regressions are fundamentally flawed. Re-estimating their growth equation using theoretically valid instruments, we find that the growth effect of the public sector is statistically insignificant, and much smaller than the point-estimates that they report. This is consistent with the agnostic conclusion, drawn by us and others, that cross-country growth regressions are unlikely to provide a reliable answer as to whether a large public sector is growth promoting or retarding.
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| 3. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Growth and the public sector : A critical review essay
- 1997
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - 0176-2680 .- 1873-5703. ; 13:1, s. 33-52
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We review the theoretical and empirical evidence on the relation between growth and the public sector against the background of the current debate on the issue. The evidence is found to admit no conclusion on whether the relation is positive, negative or non-existent. A simple cross-country regression in an OECD sample illustrates how the relation is easily tilted from negative to positive by introducing control variables for initial GDP and the dependent population.
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| 4. |
- Ohlsson, Henry, 1956-
(författare)
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Job creation measures as activist fiscal policy : An empirical analysis of policy reaction behavior
- 1992
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - 0176-2680 .- 1873-5703. ; 8:2, s. 269-280
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The objective is to find regularities in the funds granted to job creation measures in Sweden. The funds granted before the start of the fiscal year follow a passive policy rule (trend) and an activist policy rule (systematic policy reaction). In contrast, the funds granted during the fiscal year only follow an activist rule. Unemployment determines the policy reaction while the size of the labor force captures the trend in the passive policy rule.
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
- Ade, Florian, et al.
(författare)
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Incumbency effects in government and opposition : Evidence from Germany
- 2014
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - : Elsevier BV. - 0176-2680 .- 1873-5703. ; 36, s. 117-134
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Do district incumbents in an election have an advantage, and if so, do these advantages depend on which party is in government? We estimate the incumbency effect for the direct district candidates in German federal and state elections using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). When studying the heterogeneity in these effects, we find that incumbents from both large parties, the center-right CDU and the center-left SPD, have an advantage only if the SPD is in government. This effect is robust and shows even in state elections that are unrelated to federal elections.
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| 7. |
- Aggeborn, Linuz, 1986-
(författare)
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Voter turnout and the size of government
- 2016
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - : Elsevier. - 0176-2680 .- 1873-5703. ; 43, s. 29-40
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper uses Swedish and Finnish municipal data to investigate the effect of changes in voter turnout on the tax rate, public spending and vote-shares. A reform in Sweden in 1970, which overall lowered the cost of voting, is applied as an instrument for voter turnout in local elections. The reform increased voter turnout in Sweden. The higher voter turnout resulted in higher municipal taxes and greater per capita local public spending. There are also indications that higher turnout decreased the vote share for right-wing parties. I use an individual survey data set to conclude that it was in particular low income earners that began to vote to a greater extent after the reform.
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| 8. |
- Brännlund, Anton
(författare)
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Zero per cent accountability? : How low interest rates save governments from electoral defeats
- 2021
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - : Elsevier. - 0176-2680 .- 1873-5703. ; 68
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The fact that scholars describe the response to the great recession as muted and moderate should motivate political scientists to study the economic vote from new angles. Hence, this study aims to investigate the compensating effect of falling interest rate expenditures on election outcomes because they usually fall when the economy slows down. To investigate this question, I use data from Swedish electoral districts between the years 2002 and 2014. I find that Swedish households reward local governments for falling interest rate expenditures. Moreover, this result is surprising because local politicians do not determine monetary policy and suggest that government can survive during harsh times because indebted households are compensated with lower interest rate expenditures when the degree of economic activity goes down.
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| 9. |
- Burguet, Roberto, et al.
(författare)
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Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing
- 2024
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - : Elsevier B.V. - 1873-5703 .- 0176-2680. ; 81
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among long-run (honest) firms alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest bureaucrats, generating a trade-off between collusion and corruption.
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| 10. |
- Cipullo, Davide, et al.
(författare)
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To vote, or not to vote? : Electoral campaigns and the spread of COVID-19
- 2022
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Ingår i: European Journal of Political Economy. - : Elsevier. - 0176-2680 .- 1873-5703. ; 72
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The possibility to run fair electoral campaigns is necessary for the legitimization of moderndemocracies through elections. Yet, during a pandemic, the risk that electoral campaigns wouldenhance the spread of the disease is substantive. In this paper, we estimate the causal impactof electoral campaigns on the spread of COVID-19. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation inthe schedule of local elections across Italy, we show that the electoral campaign preceding thislatter led to a significant worsening of the epidemiological situation related to the disease. Ourresults strongly highlight the importance of undertaking stringent measures along the entireelectoral process to minimize its epidemiological consequences.
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