| 1. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Value and Unacceptable Risk : Temkin’s Worries about Continuity Reconsidered
- 2005
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Ingår i: Economics and Philosophy. - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 21:2, s. 177-197
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult to determine what conclusions should be drawn from this result. Contrary to what Temkin suggests, substitutivity of equivalents is a notoriously controversial principle. But even in the absence of substitutivity, the counter-intuitive conclusion is derivable from a strengthened version of continuity for easy cases. The best move, therefore, might be to question the latter principle, even in its original simple version: as we argue, continuity for easy cases gives rise to a sorites.
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| 2. |
- Bognar, Greg
(författare)
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CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY : BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM
- 2019
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Ingår i: Economics and Philosophy. - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 35:2, s. 259-281
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can't be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what's known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Bykvist, Krister, et al.
(författare)
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Epistemic transformation and rational choice
- 2017
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Ingår i: Economics and Philosophy. - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 33:1, s. 123-136
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Most people at some point in their lives face transformative decisions that could result in experiences that are radically different from any that they have had, and that could radically change their personalities and preferences. For instance, most people make the conscious decision to either become or not become parents. In a recent but already influential book, L. A. Paul (2014) argues that transformative choices cannot be rational – or, more precisely, that they cannot be rational if one assumes what Paul sees as a cultural paradigm for rational decision-making. Paul arrives at this surprising conclusion due to her understanding of transformative experience as being both epistemically and personally transformative. An experience is epistemically transformative if it ‘teaches [a person] something she could not have learned without having that kind of experience’ (11), but it is personally transformative if it changes the person's point of view and her fundamental preferences (16).
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| 5. |
- Endörfer, Richard, 1989
(författare)
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Should market harms be an exception to the Harm Principle?
- 2022
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Ingår i: Economics and Philosophy. - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 38, s. 221-241
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many proponents of the Harm Principle seem to implicitly assume that the principle is compatible with permitting the free exchange of goods and services, even if such exchanges generate so-called market harms. I argue that, as a result, proponents of the Harm Principle face a dilemma: either the Harm Principle’s domain cannot include a large number of non-market harm cases or market harms must be treated on par with non-market harms. I then go on to discuss three alternative arguments defending the status of market harms as exceptions to the Harm Principle and discuss why these arguments also fail.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Grüne-Yanoff, Till
(författare)
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Behavioural Public Policy
- 2015
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Ingår i: Economics and Philosophy. - : CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 31:3, s. 500-506
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Grüne-Yanoff, Till, et al.
(författare)
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TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING BEHAVIOURAL POLICIES : HOW TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BOOSTS AND NUDGES
- 2018
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Ingår i: Economics and Philosophy. - : CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. - 0266-2671 .- 1474-0028. ; 34:2, s. 243-266
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we analyse the difference between two types of behavioural policies - nudges and boosts. We distinguish them on the basis of the mechanisms through which they are expected to operate and identify the contextual conditions that are necessary for each policy to be successful. Our framework helps judging which type of policy is more likely to bring about the intended behavioural outcome in a given situation.
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