| 1. |
- Johansson, Jens
(författare)
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Francescotti on Fission
- 2009
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : Wiley. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 90:4, s. 476-481
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a ‘non-branching’ requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests is not needed.
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| 2. |
- Johansson, Jens
(författare)
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Kaufman's Response to Lucretius
- 2008
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - Los Angeles : Wiley. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 89:4, s. 470-485
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 3. |
- Ekendahl, Karl
(författare)
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Responding to the Timing Argument
- 2022
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 103:4, s. 753-771
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more importantly, I show that their objections to the Timing Argument fail as attempts to refute the argument in its most challenging form.
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| 4. |
- Eklund, Matti, 1974-
(författare)
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Schiffer on Vagueness
- 2006
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 87, s. 12-23
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 5. |
- Enflo, Karin, 1972-
(författare)
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Measuring Social Welfare by Proximity to an Optimum Population
- 2023
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : Wiley. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 104:1, s. 217-249
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This essay introduces a new type of measure of social welfare, where populations are evaluated by their resemblance to an optimum population, which is an (in principle) possible population with the highest degree of social welfare, relative to some circumstances. Here it is argued to be the largest possible population where everyone fares maximally well. The new measure is responsive to quality of welfare, equality of welfare, and the number of people. It satisfies dominance and negative monotonicity, and it avoids both the repugnant conclusion and a reverse repugnant conclusion for comparisons relative to our future on earth.
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| 6. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979-, et al.
(författare)
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In Defense of My Favourite Theory
- 2014
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : Wiley. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 95:2, s. 159-174
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non‐arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the arguments that have been levelled against My Favourite Theory and offer some arguments against intertheoretic comparisons of value.
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| 7. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979
(författare)
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Second Thoughts About My Favourite Theory
- 2022
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : Wiley. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 103:3, s. 448-470
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition, this problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such as My Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value.
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| 8. |
- Johansson, Jens, et al.
(författare)
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Causal Accounts of Harming
- 2022
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 103:2, s. 420-445
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A popular view of harming is the causal account (CA), on which harming is causing harm. CA has several attractive features. In particular, it appears well equipped to deal with the most important problems for its main competitor, the counterfactual comparative account (CCA). However, we argue that, despite its advantages, CA is ultimately an unacceptable theory of harming. Indeed, while CA avoids several counterexamples to CCA, it is vulnerable to close variants of some of the problems that beset CCA.
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| 9. |
- Johansson, Jens
(författare)
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Francescotti on Fission
- 2009
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - Los Angeles. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 10. |
- Johansson, Jens, et al.
(författare)
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"Pure Time Preference" : Reply to Lowry and Peterson
- 2016
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : Wiley. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 97:3, s. 435-441
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. In this reply, we argue that Lowry and Peterson's argument is unsuccessful.
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