| 1. |
- Kosfeld, Michael, et al.
(författare)
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A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching
- 2002
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Ingår i: Games and economic behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 40:2, s. 270-298
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze a myopic strategy adjustment process in strategic-form games. It is shown that the steady states of the continuous time limit, which is constructed assuming frequent play and slow adjustment of strategies, are exactly the best-reply matching equilibria, as discussed by Droste, Kosfeld, and Voorneveld (2000. Mimeo, Tilburg University). In a best-reply matching equilibrium every player ‘matches’ the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this pure strategy is a best reply to the pure-strategy profile played by his opponents. We derive stability results for the steady states of the continuous time limit in 2×2 bimatrix games and coordination games. Analyzing the asymptotic behavior of the stochastic adjustment process in discrete time shows convergence to minimal curb sets of the game. Moreover, absorbing states of the process correspond to best-reply matching equilibria of the game.
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| 2. |
- Mattsson, Lars-Göran, et al.
(författare)
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Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality
- 2002
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 41:1, s. 61-78
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We derive a family of probabilistic choice models, including the multinomial logit model, from a microecononic model in which the decision maker has to make some effort in order to implement any desired outcome. The disutility of this effort enters the decision maker's goal function in an additively separable way. A particular disutility function, yielding the multinomial logit as a special case, is characterized axiamatically. The present approach naturally leads to a normalization of the achieved utility with respect to the number of alternatives. The approach also applies to continuum choice sets in Euclidean spaces, and provides a microeconomic foundation for logit-type quantal-response models in game theory.
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| 3. |
- Wärneryd, Karl
(författare)
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Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets
- 2002
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Ingår i: Games and economic behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 41:2, s. 344-364
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are perfectly dissipated in material terms at a steady state, efficiency is greater than if everybody had been risk neutral, since risk lovers specialize in rent seeking.
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| 4. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution and Kantian morality
- 2016
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Academic Press. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 98, s. 56-67
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative. Individuals' preferences are their private information. The set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions. We show that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kantian flavor, are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable. We also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of Maynard Smith's and Price's (1973) notion of evolutionary stability of strategies.
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| 5. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum
- 2024
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 140, s. 585-587
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2016, Games and Economic Behavior) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moralis with the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2013, Econometrica).
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| 6. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Robustness to strategic uncertainty
- 2014
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 85:1, s. 272-288
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.
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| 7. |
- Arechar, Antonio A., et al.
(författare)
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“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games
- 2017
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 104, s. 726-743
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We let participants indicate their intended action in a repeated game experiment where actions are implemented with errors. Even though communication is cheap talk, we find that the majority of messages were honest (although the majority of participants lied at least occasionally). As a result, communication has a positive effect on cooperation when the payoff matrix makes the returns to cooperation high; when the payoff matrix gives a lower return to cooperation, communication reduces overall cooperation. These results suggest that cheap talk communication can promote cooperation in repeated games, but only when there is already a self-interested motivation to cooperate.
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| 8. |
- Banerjee, Abhijit, et al.
(författare)
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Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games
- 2000
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Ingår i: Games and economic behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 32:1, s. 1-24
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games and specifically characterizes the set of neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk 2×2 coordination games. With a finite message set, this set is finite. As the number of messages goes to infinity, the set expands toward a countable limit. The Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium payoff is its unique cluster point. By contrast, the corresponding limit set of strategically stable outcomes is dense in the interval spanned by the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the underlying game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C70.
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| 9. |
- Bastani, Spencer, Docent, 1982-, et al.
(författare)
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Simple equilibria in general contests
- 2022
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 134, s. 264-280
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We show how symmetric equilibria emerge in general two-player contests in which skill and effort are combined to produce output according to a general production technology and players have skills drawn from different distributions. The model includes the Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) models as special cases. Our paper provides intuition regarding how the contest components interact to determine the incentive to exert effort and sheds new light on classic comparative statics results. In particular, we show that more heterogeneity can increase equilibrium effort.
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| 10. |
- Bernergård, Axel, et al.
(författare)
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Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies
- 2019
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 117, s. 82-97
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies and first-price auctions. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies.
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