| 1. |
- Andersson, Per F., et al.
(författare)
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Crises, investments, and political institutions
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Politics. - : SAGE Publications. - 0951-6298 .- 1460-3667. ; 30:4, s. 410-430
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future policy choices. Second, it shows that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more effective government than power-concentration institutions, in contrast to much of the normative literature in comparative politics, in which power-sharing institutions are often justified on other grounds, such as representativeness, responsiveness, or social cohesion. In a world where crises dominate, power-concentration institutions typically perform better; in a world where investment problems dominate, power-sharing institutions typically perform better.
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| 2. |
- Carlsson, Lars
(författare)
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Nonhierarchical Implementation Analysis: An Alternative to the Methodological Mismatch in Policy Analysis
- 1996
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Politics. - : SAGE Publications. - 0951-6298 .- 1460-3667. ; 8:4, s. 527-
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Contemporary western societies can be described as negotiated economies, as multi-actor societies with fuzzy borders between public and private organizations and institutions. In this article it is argued that if we aim at understanding the processes of policy-making, we have to start our investigations from a point where we do not unreflectively assume that political administrative hierarchy prevails. The relevance of formal political institutions has to be proved, not taken for granted. Adopting a naive `stage-model' of the policy-making process, however, may lead to anticipating reality, or replacing empirical findings with political administrative norms. This is due not only to the history of political science, with its focus on formal institutions, but also to the fact that hierarchy is a human way of simplifying a complex environment. The implementation structure approach is suggested as an alternative methodological device for conducting a nonhierarchical implementation analysis to circumvent this problem. The approach provides a fruitful point of departure for a broad discussion of alternative ways of achieving constitutional order in society.
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| 3. |
- Folke, Olle, et al.
(författare)
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Who wins preference votes? An analysis of party loyalty, ideology, and accountability to voters
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Politics. - : SAGE Publications. - 0951-6298 .- 1460-3667. ; 32:1, s. 11-35
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the distribution of preference votes across politicians with different behaviors and attitudes. There are two main findings. First, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more active in communicating their policy proposals and policy priorities. This suggests that preference voting may incentivize more transparency and communication among politicians, and, hence, be positive for accountability. Second, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more-not less-loyal to the party in their voting decisions, and to politicians who's ideological and policy positions are mainstream-rather than extreme-compared to their party colleagues. Together with the first finding, this suggests that preference voting can strengthen the bond of accountability between voters and politicians without undercutting parties' ideological cohesion.
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| 4. |
- Lane, JE, et al.
(författare)
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A note on Nice
- 2002
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Politics. - : SAGE Publications. - 0951-6298 .- 1460-3667. ; 14:1, s. 123-128
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 5. |
- Pellicer, Miquel, et al.
(författare)
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Poor people’s beliefs and the dynamics of clientelism
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Politics. - : SAGE Publications. - 0951-6298 .- 1460-3667. ; 33:3, s. 300-332
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Why do some poor people engage in clientelism whereas others do not? Why does clientelism sometimes take traditional forms and sometimes more instrumental forms? We propose a formal model of clientelism that addresses these questions focusing primarily on the citizen’s perspective. Citizens choose between supporting broad-based redistribution or engaging in clientelism. Introducing insights from social psychology, we study the interactions between citizen beliefs and values, and their political choices. Clientelism, political inefficacy, and inequality legitimation beliefs reinforce each other leading to multiple equilibria. One of these resembles traditional clientelism, with disempowered clients that legitimize social inequalities. Community connectivity breaks this reinforcement mechanism and leads to another equilibrium where clientelism takes a modern, instrumental, form. The model delivers insights on the role of citizen beliefs for their bargaining power as well as for the persistence and transformation of clientelism. We illustrate the key mechanisms with ethnographic literature on the topic.
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| 6. |
- Ting, Michael M., et al.
(författare)
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Elections and reform : The adoption of civil service systems in the US states
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Politics. - : SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD. - 0951-6298 .- 1460-3667. ; 25:3, SI, s. 363-387
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Most government bureaucracies in developed countries use civil service systems. What accounts for their adoption? We develop and test a model of bureaucratic reforms under repeated partisan competition. In the model, two political parties composed of overlapping generations of candidates compete for office. Under a spoils system, an incumbent politician can either continue to politicize the bureaucracy, which allows her to direct benefits to voters in a way that will increase her electoral prospects, or she can insulate the bureaucracy, which prevents all future winners from using the bureaucracy for electoral advantage. Our main result is that politicization persists when incumbents expect to win, and insulation takes place when they expect to lose. We test this hypothesis using data from the adoption of civil service reforms across the U.S. states.The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical patterns leading up to the implementation of the general civil service reforms. Using both state and city level data, we observe an increase in partisan competition prior to the reforms.
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