| 1. |
|
|
| 2. |
- Öberg, PerOla, 1961-
(författare)
-
Does Administrative Corporatism Promote Trust and Deliberation?
- 2002
-
Ingår i: Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. - Malden : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 15:4, s. 455-475
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- How corporatist arrangements actually work has not been empirically demonstrated, despite the theoretical focus on interest intermediation. This article investigates whether corporatism affects trust and deliberation in state activities, using Swedish public administration as a case study. First, it is doubtful that corporatism directly promotes trust among citizens, but it very likely promotes trust within and between the represented organizations. Second, interest-group representation cannot be understood as a process of strict delivering of positions adopted in advance. Preferences are often transformed in discussions where other interests are involved. Furthermore, the case investigated here shows that the decision-making process within a corporatist arrangement resembles deliberation, rather than negotiations between "contesting interests".
|
|
| 3. |
- Agerberg, Mattias, 1986
(författare)
-
Messaging about corruption: The power of social norms
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Governance-an International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895. ; 35:3, s. 929-950
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- While commonly deployed in anti-corruption programs, corruption messaging has shown limited success. I argue that strategies focusing on injunctive norms (what most people approve of) have been underutilized and could be a feasible way of influencing perceptions in a desirable direction. In two studies fielded in Mexico, I first identify a substantial discrepancy between how individuals view the permissibility of corruption and their perceptions of other people's attitudes. In a follow-up preregistered experiment, I leverage this tension by randomly informing a treatment group about people's strong anti-corruption attitudes. The results show that the treatment group became significantly more positive with regard to the attitudes of others. Moreover, they report higher interpersonal trust, are less likely view corruption as a basic part of Mexican culture, and show lower willingness to bribe. The study contributes to our understanding of corruption as a social phenomenon and provides insights about how to construct effective anti-corruption messages.
|
|
| 4. |
- Bauhr, Monika, 1973, et al.
(författare)
-
Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability
- 2014
-
Ingår i: Governance-an International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895. ; 27:2, s. 291-320
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- International organizations, policy experts, and nongovernmental organizations promote greater governmental transparency as a crucial reform to enhance accountability and curb corruption. Transparency is predicted to deter corruption in part by expanding the possibilities for public or societal accountability, that is, for citizens and citizens associations to monitor, scrutinize, and act to hold public office holders to account. Although the societal accountability mechanism linking transparency and good government is often implied, it builds on a number of assumptions seldom examined empirically. This article unpacks the assumptions of principal-agent theories of accountability and suggests that the logic of collective action can be used to understand why exposure of egregious and endemic corruption may instead demobilize the demos (i.e., resignation) rather than enhance accountability (i.e., indignation). We explore these theoretical contentions and examine how transparency affects three indicators of indignations versus resignation-institutional trust, political involvement, and political interest-given different levels of corruption. The empirical analyses confirm that an increase in transparency in highly corrupt countries tends to breed resignation rather than indignation.
|
|
| 5. |
- Bauhr, Monika, 1973, et al.
(författare)
-
Lights on the shadows of public procurement. Transparency as an antidote to corruption
- 2020
-
Ingår i: Governance. - : Wiley. - 1468-0491 .- 0952-1895. ; 33:3, s. 495-523
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The increased focus on marketizing mechanisms and contracting-out operations following the New Public Management reform agenda has sparked a debate on whether the close interactions between public and private actors might drive corruption in the public sector. The main response to those worries has been increased transparency, but so far empirical evidence of its efficiency remains scant and mixed. This article argues that the beneficial effects of transparency on corruption are contingent on type of transparency, and in particular, who the intended receiver of the information is. Drawing on newly collected data of more than 3.5 million government contracts between 2006 and 2015, the analysis shows that overall tender transparency reduces corruption risks substantially, yet that the effect is largely driven by ex ante transparency, that is, transparency that allows for horizontal monitoring by insiders in the bidding process.
|
|
| 6. |
- Bauhr, Monika, 1973
(författare)
-
Need or Greed? Conditions for Collective Action against Corruption
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Governance. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 30:4, s. 561-581
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.This article calls into question one of the implicit assumptions linking democratic accountability to reduced corruption, namely, that citizens will expose institutions rife with venality and mobilize for better government. Instead, mobilization may be contingent on the type of corruption. The study develops a distinction between need and greed corruption and suggest that citizens are more likely to engage in the fight against corruption when corruption is needed to gain access to "fair" treatment (need corruption) as opposed to special illicit advantages (greed corruption). Using data from the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the study suggest that need corruption mobilizes citizens, in particular if they perceive that fellow citizens will also engage, while greed corruption leads to secrecy, demobilization, and a propensity to "free ride" on other citizens' anticorruption efforts. The study thereby contributes to a better understanding of fundamental conditions for collective action against corruption and explaining why greed corruption persists in societies with well-established institutions for accountability.
|
|
| 7. |
- Bjarnegard, Elin, et al.
(författare)
-
Sex instead of money: Conceptualizing sexual corruption
- 2024
-
Ingår i: Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. - : WILEY. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491.
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Research on the dynamics of corruption has rarely considered sex as a currency in corrupt transactions. This article puts forward the argument that the abuse of entrusted power in exchange for personal gain is relevant also when sex, rather than money, is the currency. It then contributes with a careful conceptualization of such transactions as sexual corruption. Anchoring our conceptualization in the abuse of entrusted power, the article defines sexual corruption, its elements, categories and delimitations, and proposes a conceptual framework that can be used to develop research on sexual corruption. We also address the implications of recognizing sex as a currency in corrupt transactions, providing insights as to why abuse of power is often overlooked when sex is the currency of the transaction. Our approach offers analytic precision and contributes to setting an agenda for the study of sexual corruption as an obstacle to good governance, at a time when efforts to collect data on sexual corruption are increasing.
|
|
| 8. |
- Boräng, Frida, 1977, et al.
(författare)
-
Cooking the books: Bureaucratic politicization and policy knowledge
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Governance. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 31:1, s. 7-26
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Accurate knowledge about societal conditions and public policies is an important public good in any polity, yet governments across the world differ dramatically in the extent to which they collect and publish such knowledge. This article develops and tests the argument that this variation to some extent can be traced to the degree of bureaucratic politicization in a polity. A politicized bureaucracy offers politicians greater opportunities to demand from bureaucrats-and raises incentives for bureaucrats to supply-public policy knowledge that is strategically biased or suppressed in a manner that benefits incumbents reputationally. Due to electoral competition, we suggest that the link between bureaucratic politicization and politicized policy knowledge will be stronger in democracies than in autocracies. A case analysis of Argentina's statistical agency lends credence to the underlying causal mechanism. Time-series cross-sectional analyses confirm the broader validity of the expectations and show that the relationship is present only in democracies.
|
|
| 9. |
- Broms, Rasmus, 1984, et al.
(författare)
-
Competition and service quality: Evidence from Swedish residential care homes
- 2020
-
Ingår i: Governance. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 33:3, s. 525-543
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Against a backdrop of increased levels of marketization of welfare services in OECD countries, this article aims to shed light on the separate effects of private ownership and competition for the market on service quality. Using residential elder care homes in Sweden as our case, we leverage unique panel data of ownership and competition against a set of indicators, pertaining to the structure, process, and outcome dimensions of care quality. The main finding of our analyses is that competition for the market does surprisingly little for quality: private entrepreneurs perform neither better nor worse under stiff competition and the quality of care is approximately the same in those nursing homes that are exposed to the market as in those that are not.
|
|
| 10. |
- Broms, Rasmus, 1984, et al.
(författare)
-
Inheritance regimes: Medieval family structures and current institutional quality
- 2019
-
Ingår i: Governance. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 32:4
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This study highlights the impact that medieval patterns of intrafamily inheritance practices wield on contemporary institutional quality. We argue that regions that practiced inegalitarian inheritance developed stronger institutions than regions that practiced egalitarian inheritance, for two reasons. First, we argue that transmitting land to a single heir resulted in a sense of personal ownership and, by extension, encouraged individual property rights. Second, we argue that the fact that disinherited children were incentivized to seek training and employment outside the family domicile in regions practicing inegalitarian inheritance resulted in trust-building social interactions. We test our argument using data on medieval inheritance patterns and modern-day institutional quality in European subnational regions and across countries globally. Our results show that historical inegalitarian inheritance practices are strongly positively associated with contemporary institutional quality. We conclude that historical norms at the family level are still affecting important modern-day societal functions.
|
|
