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- Bojner Horwitz, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Writer's Block Revisited Micro-Phenomenological Case Study on the Blocking Influence of an Internalized Voice
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : Imprint Academic. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 25:3-4, s. 9-28
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Writer's block, a common form of procrastination, can have a serious negative impact on an individual's academic performance. In this case study, a student with writer's block was interviewed and asked to perform body movements that represented the process of writing a master's thesis. A micro-phenomenological method was used to investigate the student's experience of writer's block and the role of an inner voice. The analysis unveiled the process by which the inner voice impeded the student, i.e. how the student perceived a set of mental images, movements, and sensations in relation to the 'inner voice'. The findings suggest that non-verbal modes of learning - through movement - may be applied productively to overcome writer's block and other forms of procrastination in broader areas such as research writing. Moreover, the micro-phenomenological method, together with the interpretation of video recordings, can reveal valuable information regarding this learning process in higher education.
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| 2. |
- Brinck, Ingar, et al.
(författare)
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Change blindness in higher-order thought : Misrepresentation or good enough?
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 24:5-6, s. 50-73
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- To evaluate the explanation of change blindness in terms of misrepresentation and determine its role for David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory of consciousness, we present an alternative account of change blindness that affords an independent outlook and provides a viable alternative. First we describe Rosenthal’s actualism and the notion of misrepresentation, then introduce change blindness and the explanation of it by misrepresentation. Rosenthal asserts that in change blindness, the first-order state tracks the post-change stimulus, but the higher-order state misrepresents it. We propose the alternative that both post-change and pre-change content can be tracked by the first order state, and that in change blindness the higher-order thought represents the pre-change state, resulting in a good-enough representation: true but not veridical. We compare the two explanations with respect to available data and analyse the principal theoretical claims. Discussing the rationale of the alternative account, we conclude that there is good reason to conceive of the mind as satisficing, geared towards reliability instead of truth-tracking, and guided by representations that are good enough as opposed to complete or corresponding to the facts. We end by some methodological remarks concerning the risk of cognitive biases in interdisciplinary research that brings together empirical and philosophical claims.
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| 5. |
- Burns, Tom R., et al.
(författare)
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The Social Construction of Consciousness : Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity. Part 2
- 1998
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - Thorverton. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 5:2, s. 166-184
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- From a sociological and social psychological perspective, this paper outlines and develops a theoretical framework with which to define and analyse consciousness, emphasizing the role of language, collective representations, conceptions of self, and self-reflectivity in human conscious phenomena. The paper focuses on the social origins of conscious phenomena, on collective as well as individual levels. Part 1 of the paper (Burns and Engdahl, 1998a) dealt with collective consciousness. This second part analyses individual consciousness as arising in the context of a person experiencing herself as an object of collective representation and collective reflection and discourse. Individual consciousness is the outcome of processes of collective naming, classifying, monitoring, judging, reflecting on, and conducting discussions and discourses about, the individual herself. A participant learns in the collective context (in line with George Herbert Mead's earlier formulations) a naming and classification of herself (self-description and identity), of her judgments, actions, and predispositions. In acquiring a language and conceptual framework for this mode of activity -- along with experience and skills in reflective discussion -- she develops a capability of inner reflection and inner dialogue about self, which are characteristic features of individual consciousness. The analysis goes on to distinguish multiple modes of individual awareness and consciousness, distinguishing awareness from consciousness proper, and also identifying pre- and sub-conscious levels. This points up the complexity of the human mind, in part its elaboration through processes of social interaction and construction.
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| 6. |
- Byrne, Eleanor
(författare)
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Grief in Chronic Illness A Case Study of CFS/ME
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : IMPRINT ACADEMIC. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 29:9-10, s. 175-200
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper points to a more expansive conception of grief by arguing that the losses of illness can be genuine objects of grief. I argue for this by illuminating underappreciated structural features of typical grief - that is, grief over a bereavement - which are shared but under-recognized. I offer a common chronic illness, chronic fat-igue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME), as a striking case study. I then use this analysis to highlight some clinical challenges that arise should this claim receive uptake in clinical practice. Extant literature on CFS/ME tells us that rates of comorbid depression are atypically high. If one accepts that people with CFS/ ME can grieve over losses associated with the condition, and that grief can be easily mistaken for depression in this context, this might suggest that rates of comorbid depression are inflated. I show, how-ever, that the challenge of distinguishing between healthy and pathol-ogical grief arises in its place, and is just as tricky to solve.
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| 9. |
- Hesslow, Germund, et al.
(författare)
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The inner world of a simple robot
- 2007
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Ingår i: Journal of Consciousness Studies. - 1355-8250. ; 14:7, s. 85-96
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The purpose of the paper is to discuss whether a particular robot can be said to have an 'inner world', something that can be taken to be a critical feature of consciousness. It has previously been argued that the mechanism underlying the appearance of an inner world in humans is an ability of our brains to simulate behaviour and perception. A robot has previously been designed in which perception can be simulated. A prima facie case can be made that this robot has an inner world in the same sense as humans. Various objections to this claim are discussed in the paper and it is concluded that the robot, although extremely simple, can easily be improved without adding any new principles, so that ascribing an inner world to it becomes intuitively reasonable.
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