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- Bojner Horwitz, Eva, et al.
(författare)
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Writer's Block Revisited Micro-Phenomenological Case Study on the Blocking Influence of an Internalized Voice
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : Imprint Academic. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 25:3-4, s. 9-28
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Writer's block, a common form of procrastination, can have a serious negative impact on an individual's academic performance. In this case study, a student with writer's block was interviewed and asked to perform body movements that represented the process of writing a master's thesis. A micro-phenomenological method was used to investigate the student's experience of writer's block and the role of an inner voice. The analysis unveiled the process by which the inner voice impeded the student, i.e. how the student perceived a set of mental images, movements, and sensations in relation to the 'inner voice'. The findings suggest that non-verbal modes of learning - through movement - may be applied productively to overcome writer's block and other forms of procrastination in broader areas such as research writing. Moreover, the micro-phenomenological method, together with the interpretation of video recordings, can reveal valuable information regarding this learning process in higher education.
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| 4. |
- Burns, Tom R., et al.
(författare)
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The Social Construction of Consciousness : Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity. Part 2
- 1998
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - Thorverton. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 5:2, s. 166-184
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- From a sociological and social psychological perspective, this paper outlines and develops a theoretical framework with which to define and analyse consciousness, emphasizing the role of language, collective representations, conceptions of self, and self-reflectivity in human conscious phenomena. The paper focuses on the social origins of conscious phenomena, on collective as well as individual levels. Part 1 of the paper (Burns and Engdahl, 1998a) dealt with collective consciousness. This second part analyses individual consciousness as arising in the context of a person experiencing herself as an object of collective representation and collective reflection and discourse. Individual consciousness is the outcome of processes of collective naming, classifying, monitoring, judging, reflecting on, and conducting discussions and discourses about, the individual herself. A participant learns in the collective context (in line with George Herbert Mead's earlier formulations) a naming and classification of herself (self-description and identity), of her judgments, actions, and predispositions. In acquiring a language and conceptual framework for this mode of activity -- along with experience and skills in reflective discussion -- she develops a capability of inner reflection and inner dialogue about self, which are characteristic features of individual consciousness. The analysis goes on to distinguish multiple modes of individual awareness and consciousness, distinguishing awareness from consciousness proper, and also identifying pre- and sub-conscious levels. This points up the complexity of the human mind, in part its elaboration through processes of social interaction and construction.
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| 5. |
- Byrne, Eleanor
(författare)
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Grief in Chronic Illness A Case Study of CFS/ME
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : IMPRINT ACADEMIC. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 29:9-10, s. 175-200
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper points to a more expansive conception of grief by arguing that the losses of illness can be genuine objects of grief. I argue for this by illuminating underappreciated structural features of typical grief - that is, grief over a bereavement - which are shared but under-recognized. I offer a common chronic illness, chronic fat-igue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME), as a striking case study. I then use this analysis to highlight some clinical challenges that arise should this claim receive uptake in clinical practice. Extant literature on CFS/ME tells us that rates of comorbid depression are atypically high. If one accepts that people with CFS/ ME can grieve over losses associated with the condition, and that grief can be easily mistaken for depression in this context, this might suggest that rates of comorbid depression are inflated. I show, how-ever, that the challenge of distinguishing between healthy and pathol-ogical grief arises in its place, and is just as tricky to solve.
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| 7. |
- Hydén, Lars-Christer
(författare)
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Dementia, Embodied Memories, and the Self
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : Imprint Academic. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 25:7-8, s. 225-241
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Researchers in cognition and linguistics have in the last couple of decades argued that more complex memories of the kind often called episodic memories are embodied and are multimodal. This is something that is interesting in the field of persons living with, for example, neurodegenerative dementia. In this article the interest is on how bodily gestures can be used to make sense of episodic memories that cannot be verbally communicated by persons with dementia. Empirical examples are discussed with a focus on the use of bodily gestures and how the stories are connected to identities and a sense of self. A key conclusion is that embodied resources like bodily gestures can be used to construct and communicate a sense of self. It further indicates that modal aspects of memories are central in the communicative sense-making process. Finally, the examples demonstrate how embodied episodic memories can be used to present and sustain a sense of self
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| 8. |
- Karlsson, Gunnar, 1955-
(författare)
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Psychoanalysis and the question of self : A dialogue with spiritual traditions
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 23:1-2, s. 179-195
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- From a psychoanalytic point of view it is. well established that an early development of a sense of self is crucial to a person's healthy development. At the same time, the psychoanalytic process can to a large extent be described as a deconstruction of narcissistic and illusionary apprehensions of oneself. With this as a background, I want to discuss the notion of self within a psychoanalytic perspective in relationship to the meaning of self and no-self within spiritual traditions. The most striking similarity between psychoanalytical and spiritual practice is identified as the (controlling) ego's surrender or letting go. The article ends with an attempt to characterize the self that is disclosed in the liberating experience of letting go.
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| 9. |
- Khrennikov, Andrei
(författare)
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The quantum-like brain on the cognitive and subcognitive time scales
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 15:7, s. 39-77
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article takes as its point of departure the view that the discovery of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics (QM) was not merely a discovery of a new mathematical way of dealing with physical, and specifically quantum, processes in nature. It was also a discovery of a general mathematical formalism (in part discovered in mathematics itself earlier), which, supplemented by certain additional rules, consistently described the processing of incomplete information about certain events and contexts in which these events occur. This article proposes a quantum-like (QL) model of the functioning of the brain based on the (Hilbert-space) formalism of quantum mechanics, but now used as part of a QL mathematical model of neural processes in the brain, rather than for describing quantum physical processes. This model is, thus, fundamentally different from the (reductionist) quantum model of the brain and consciousness, according to which cognition arises by virtue of physical quantum processes in the brain. In the present view, the brain is an advanced biological system that developed the ability to create a QL representation of contexts, which, thus, allows one to describe a significant part of its functioning by the QM mathematical formalism. The possibility of such a description has nothing to do with the constitution and workings of the brain as a quantum system (composed of photons, electrons, protons, and so forth). The QL model offered here is based instead on conventional neurophysiological model of the functioning of the brain, even though the brain, the article suggests, does use the QL rule (given by von Neumann trace formula, used in QM) for the calculation of approximate averages for mental functions. The QL model developed in this article has a temporal basis, based on a (hypothetical) argument that cognitive processes are based on at least two time scales: a (very fine) subcognitive one and a (much coarser) cognitive one.
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| 10. |
- Käll, Lisa, 1971-, et al.
(författare)
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Bodily Relational Autonomy
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of consciousness studies. - : IMPRINT ACADEMIC. - 1355-8250 .- 2051-2201. ; 21:9-10, s. 100-120
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Conceptions of autonomy in western philosophy and ethics have often centred on self-governance and self-determination. However, a growing bulk of literature also questions such conceptions, including the understanding of the autonomous self as a self-governing independent individual that chooses, acts, and lives in accordance with her or his own values, norms, or sense of sell This article contributes to the critical interrogation of selfhood, autonomy, and autonomous decision making by combining a feminist focus on relational dimensions of selfhood and autonomy with phenomenological philosophy of the embodied self as being-in-the-world. It offers a philosophical investigation of different dimensions of bodily relational autonomy by turning to phenomenological accounts of the lived body as self-reflexive. When so doing, we hope to contribute to bridging the gap that sometimes exists between discussions of autonomy in analytic moral philosophy and of freedom and facticity in phenomenological philosophy. We see this gap as unfortunate, and hold that a nuanced understanding of autonomy and autonomous decision making can be reached if these strands of philosophy are brought into dialogue.
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