| 1. |
- Andersson, Emil, 1982-
(author)
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Freedom, Equality, and Justifiability to All : Reinterpreting Liberal Legitimacy
- 2022
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In: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer Nature. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 26, s. 591-612
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- According to John Rawls’s famous Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all citizens. The currently dominant interpretation of what is justifiable to persons in this sense is an internalist one. On this view, what is justifiable to persons depends on their beliefs and commitments. In this paper I challenge this reading of Rawls’s principle, and instead suggest that it is most plausibly interpreted in externalist terms. On this alternative view, what is justifiable to persons is not in any way dependent on, or relativized to, their beliefs and commitments. Instead, what is justifiable to all in the relevant sense is what all could accept as free and equal. I defend this reinterpretation of the view by showing how it is supported by Rawls’s account of the freedom and equality of persons. In addition, a considerable advantage of this suggestion is that it allows for an inclusive account of to whom the exercise of political power must be made justifiable.
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| 2. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-
(author)
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Do ‘objectivist’ features of moral discourse and thinking support moral objectivism?
- 2012
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In: Journal of Ethics. - Nederländerna : Springer Netherlands. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 16:4, s. 367-393
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this argument should be taken seriously (recent arguments notwithstanding), I argue that it is nevertheless undermined by considerations of moral disagreement. Even if the metaphysical, epistemic and semantic commitments of objectivism provide little or no evidence against it, and even if the alternative explanations of ‘objectivist’ traits of moral discourse and thinking are speculative or contrived, objectivism is itself incapable of making straightforward sense of these traits. Deep and widespread moral disagreement or, rather, the mere appearance of such disagreement, strongly suggests that the explanations operative in paradigmatically objective discourse fail to carry over to the moral case. Since objectivism, no less than relativism, non-cognitivism and error-theories, needs non-trivial explanations of why we behave ‘as if’ objec- tivism were correct, such behavior does not presently provide reason to accept objectivism.
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| 3. |
- Brandstedt, Eric, et al.
(author)
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Rawlsian Constructivism : A Practical Guide to Reflective Equilibrium
- 2020
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In: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 24:3, s. 355-373
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Many normative theorists want to contribute to making the world a better place. In recent years, it has been suggested that to realise this ambition one must start with an adequate description of real-life practices. To determine what should be done, however, one must also fundamentally criticise existing moral beliefs. The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of doing both. Yet, its practical usefulness has been doubted and it has been largely ignored in the recent practical turn of normative theorising. This paper offers a complementary methodology to the method of reflective equilibrium, referred to as Rawlsian constructivism, which brings forth its practical merits. With the support of Rawlsian constructivism, the method of reflective equilibrium becomes a tool for public reasoning about practical problems which aims to facilitate shared solutions. The process of reflective scrutiny is used, not in the search of moral truth, but rather to highlight what stands in the way of solutions to problems agents face in different domains of social life. The practical value lies in scrutinising reasons for action that are taken for granted, explicating new rationales for action and highlighting neglected points of agreement. The paper exemplifies this approach with a process of justifying individual obligations to combat climate change. Normative theorists who share the practical agenda have correctly noted the importance of bottom-up investigations of subject domains. This paper argues that the next step should be to utilise this version of the method of reflective equilibrium to explore the potential for morally progressive solutions to these problems.
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| 4. |
- Hansson, Sven Ove
(author)
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John Stuart Mill and the Conflicts of Equality
- 2022
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In: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer Nature. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 26:3, s. 433-453
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- John Stuart Mill commented on the relationship between equality and liberty in general terms, and he also discussed the relationships between equality and four more concrete social goals: equality vs. diversity and individual spontaneity, equality vs. freedom of trade and entrepreneurial activity, equality vs. economic incentives for workpeople, and equality vs. welfare. In his more general statements he wrote off potential conflicts between equality and liberty, claiming that only those liberties that can be enjoyed by all are real liberties—or at least they are the only ones worth defending. However, in several of his more concrete discussions he gave higher priority to various liberty-related goals than to equality. This seeming contradiction can be resolved if we assume that he distinguished between valuing a liberty per se and valuing it as a means to achieve something else.
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| 5. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia, et al.
(author)
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Patronizing praise
- 2022
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In: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer Netherlands. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 26, s. 663-682
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Praise, unlike blame, is generally considered well intended and beneficial, and therefore in less need of scrutiny. In line with recent developments, we argue that praise merits more thorough philosophical analysis. We show that, just like blame, praise can be problematic by expressing a failure to respect a person’s equal value or worth as a person. Such patronizing praise, however, is often more insidious, because praise tends to be regarded as well intended and beneficial, which renders it harder to recognize and object to. Among other things, a philosophical analysis of patronizing praise helps people on the receiving end articulate why they feel uncomfortable or offended by it, shows patronizing praisers how their praise is problematic, and provides input for further philosophical analysis of blame. In the first section of the paper, we discuss how hypocritical praise, just like hypocritical blame, can fail to respect the equality of persons by expressing that the praiser applies more demanding moral standards to the praisee than to themself. We further discuss obstructionist praise, which loosely corresponds to complicit blame, and can similarly express that certain moral standards apply to others but not to the praiser. In the second part of the paper, we discuss another variety of patronizing praise. Praise can be an inaccurate appraisal of a person based on irrelevant considerations – like race, gender, or class – and thereby constitute a failure to recognize their equal worth as a person. We identify three ways in which such praise can manifest.
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| 6. |
- Johansson, Jens
(author)
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Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes : Reply to Brueckner and Fischer
- 2014
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In: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 18, s. 11-18
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against my critique.
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| 7. |
- Johansson, Jens
(author)
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Asymmetry and Incoherence : A Reply to Cyr
- 2017
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In: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 21:2, s. 215-221
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the Deprivation Approach against the Lucretian objection. My criticism involved a thought experiment in which a person avoids being tortured. Recently, Taylor Cyr has defended Fischer and Brueckner's approach, arguing that my thought experiment is incoherent. In this response, I question both the truth and relevance of Cyr's incoherence claim.
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| 8. |
- Johansson, Jens
(author)
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More on the Mirror: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner
- 2014
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In: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 18:4, s. 341-351
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, I have objected that it is irrelevant what it is in fact rational for the person to care about. Fischer and Brueckner have replied to my critique. In this paper I respond to their latest pair of replies.
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| 9. |
- Johansson, Jens
(author)
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Past and Future Non-Existence
- 2012
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In: Journal of Ethics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1382-4554 .- 1572-8609. ; 17, s. 51-64
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Review (peer-reviewed)abstract
- According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different from death. This paper criticizes these responses.
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| 10. |
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