| 1. |
- Anthonsen, Mette, 1972, et al.
(författare)
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Effects of rent dependency on quality of government
- 2012
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Ingår i: Economics of Governance. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1435-6104 .- 1435-8131. ; 13:2, s. 145-168
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper introduces quality of government rather than regime type as dependent variable in studies of political effects of natural resources. It consists of two parts. First, it argues for an effect of fiscal dependency of oil and gas rents on quality of government. Second, it finds significant, negative effects of oil and gas rent dependency on three empirical indicators of quality of government-low corruption, bureaucratic quality and legal impartiality-in a sample of 139 states in the period 1984-2006. The results hold for inclusion of control variables such as regime type, income, region and religion.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Bjorvatn, Kjetil, et al.
(författare)
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Are not-for-profits different? Theory and evidence on the pricing of health services in Uganda
- 2016
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Ingår i: Economics of Governance. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1435-6104 .- 1435-8131. ; 17:1, s. 1-10
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Public provision of health and education in developing countries is often insufficient and inefficient. There is thus a call for a greater involvement of private providers to supply affordable and high-quality services to the population. In particular, it is often suggested that not-for-profit institutions should play a larger role, given their social mission. But do not-for-profits really behave differently from for-profit institutions? The literature does not provide a clear answer to this question. The present contribution offers evidence based on a simple theoretical model and price data from health care providers in Uganda with different governance structures. Using differences in market structure as source of variation, we find that not-for-profits indeed behave differently from for-profit institutions, with a pricing behavior that is consistent with an emphasis on health impact and not just profit maximization. Our results thus provide an argument for a policy trying to attract not-for-profit health clinics to fill the gap of an inefficient public health provision.
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| 4. |
- Feidler, Janos, et al.
(författare)
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Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods
- 2012
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Ingår i: Economics of Governance. - : Springer. - 1435-6104 .- 1435-8131. ; 13:1, s. 73-93
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making on the provision of local public goods. Decisions are influenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictional size. Centralized decisions aremade in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive, or misallocative provision of public goods. The form of centralized decision making has a significant influence on the incentives for centralizing decision making.
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| 5. |
- Jacobsson, Adam, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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Counter-Intuitive Effects of Domestic Law Enforcement Policies in the United States
- 2009
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Ingår i: Economics of Governance. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1435-6104 .- 1435-8131. ; 10:14, s. 323-343
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In spite of the increase in domestic law enforcement policies in the U.S. drug related crime has followed a non-monotonic trend and cocaine and heroin prices, instead of increasing, have been dropping or remained stable over time. All this in a context of an increase in these drugs’ consumption during the 1980s and a small decrease during the 1990s. This paper provides an explanation to these counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies. We model how drug lords respond to this type of policy within a conflict framework over the control of distribution activities for illegal drugs, which is novel. The model predicts drug distribution activities, drug prices and drug consumption. These predictions appear to be consistent with the empirical evidence in the United States.
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| 6. |
- Poutvaara, Panu, et al.
(författare)
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Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity Backfire?
- 2011
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Ingår i: Economics of Governance. - : Springer. - 1435-6104 .- 1435-8131. ; 12, s. 259-273
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we study how unemployment affects gang crime. We examine a model of criminal gangs and suggest that a substitution effect between petty crime and severe crime is at work. In the model, non-monetary valuation of gang membership is private knowledge. Thus, the leaders face a trade-off between less crime per member in large gangs and more crime per member in small gangs. A decrease in unemployment may result in a switch from a large gang that requires petty crime to a small gang that requires severe crime.
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| 7. |
- Priks, Mikael, 1973-
(författare)
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Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies
- 2011
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Ingår i: Economics of Governance. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1435-6104 .- 1435-8131. ; 12:1, s. 75-88
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- References (39) Export Citation About Abstract Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption.
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