| 1. |
- Fritsch, Lothar, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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Implications of Privacy & Security Research for the Upcoming Battlefield of Things
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare. - : Peregrine Technical Solutions, LLC. - 1445-3312. ; 17:4, s. 72-87
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article presents the results of a trend-scouting study on the applicability of contemporary information privacy and information security research in future defence scenarios in a 25-year-horizon. The authors sketch the expected digital warfare and defence environment as a‘Battlefield of Things’ in which connected objects, connected soldiers, and automated and autonomous sensing and acting systems are core elements. Based on this scenario, the authors discuss current research in information security and information privacy and their relevance and applicability for the future scenario.
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| 2. |
- Gunneriusson, Håkan, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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Cyberspace from the Hybrid Threat Perspective
- 2013
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Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare. - Reading : Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited. - 1445-3312. ; 12:3, s. 98-105
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Hybrid threats use conventional and unconventional means to achieve their goals. In this paper we explore the cyber threats as one possible aspect of hybrid threats. We describe three ways of approaching cyberspace (operations) from the hybrid threats perspective: supporting conventional operations, exploiting non-military systems, and exploring the opportunities provided by this environment. In particular, we highlight the aspects that are or likely will be relevant to the military community.
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| 3. |
- Huskaj, Gazmend, et al.
(författare)
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Offensive Cyberspace Operations and Zero-days : Anticipatory Ethics and Policy Implications for Vulnerability Disclosure
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare. - : Peregrine Technical Solutions. - 1445-3312. ; 20:1, s. 96-109
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article addresses the question under which circumstances zero-day vulnerabilities should be disclosed or used for offensive cyberspace operations. Vulnerabilities exist in hardware and software and can be seen as a consequence of programming errors or design flaws. The most highly sought are so-called zero-day-vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities exist but are unknown and, when exploited, enable one way of entry into a system that is otherwise not thought possible. Therefore, from an anticipatory ethics perspective, it is important to understand in what cases zero-days should be disclosed or not.
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| 4. |
- Huskaj, Gazmend, et al.
(författare)
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Offensive Cyberspace Operations and Zero-days : Anticipatory Ethics and Policy Implications for Vulnerability Disclosure
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare. - 1445-3312. ; 20:1, s. 96-109
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article addresses the question under which circumstances zero-day vulnerabilities should be disclosed or used for offensive cyberspace operations. Vulnerabilities exist in hardware and software and can be seen as a consequence of programming errors or design flaws. The most highly sought are so-called zero-day-vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities exist but are unknown and, when exploited, enable one way of entry into a system that is otherwise not thought possible. Therefore, from an anticipatory ethics perspective, it is important to understand in what cases zero-days should be disclosed or not.
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| 5. |
- Huskaj, Gazmend, et al.
(författare)
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Validating a Framework for Offensive Cyberspace Operations
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare. - 1445-3312. ; 21:3, s. 26-42
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The Ambidextrous Framework for Offensive Cyberspace Operations was validated using a simulated cyber conflict emulating a cyber operation against critical infrastructure of a fictious country. The purpose of the validation was to assess how well the Framework supports both planning and execution of cyber operations. Data was collected using self-reporting by a team in the cyber range training facility. The study found that the framework works well to support the planning, preparation, and order giving to execute offensive cyberspace operations. However, it was found to be less suited to support operator actions during on ongoing offensive operation due to its current lack of capability to utilize real-time data from battle-stations.
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| 6. |
- Nicander, Lars, 1953-
(författare)
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The Developmental History of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies
- 2021
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Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare. - 1445-3312. ; 20:4, s. 57-67
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article describes how to develop, adapt, and manage an independent think tank approaching new cross-sectoral forms of national security threats within a government stove-piped system. The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish Defence University was in a European context a unique hybrid entity that combined academic research with policy-relevant recommendations and trusted second opinions to Cabinet departments and agencies. This article explores how to bend stovepipes within a Swedish context in the areas of Counter-Terrorism, Intelligence Studies, Cyber Security, and Influence Operations.
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| 7. |
- Riegert, Kristina, 1964-
(författare)
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Know Your Enemy, Know Your Allies : Lessons Not Learned from the Kosovo Conflict
- 2002
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Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare. - 1445-3312. ; 1:3, s. 79-93
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- There appears to be a world of difference between NATO’s war over Kosovo in 1999 and the US-led war in Afghanistan 2001. The former was a limited war waged with the active involvement of NATO member countries against an identifiable enemy in well-known terrain, whereas the recent war in Afghanistan seems to lack any of these characteristics. Despite the differences, however, US media management in the first weeks of the war in Afghanistan have been hauntingly familiar for observers of previous conflicts. While mistakes will clearly always be made in times of crisis and war, the US efforts to shape the Information Space outside its own territory demonstrates that certain lessons should and could have been drawn from the Kosovo conflict – if the US is genuinely serious about enlisting the aid of its allies in its struggle with global terrorism.This article describes how the perceptual aspects of Information Warfare were invoked by NATO and Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict in the struggle to influence the attitudes and behaviour of each other, the media and public opinion. NATO’s own evaluation of the lessons learned regarding media management is contrasted to some lessons evidently not learned about shaping the Information Space in this asymmetric conflict situation. In light of these lessons, some indicators of recent US media management efforts are analysed during the first weeks of the war in Afghanistan to determine whether there has been a profound recognition of the need to shape the Information Space.
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| 8. |
- Wallenius, Claes, 1958-
(författare)
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Do Hostile Information Operations Really Have the Intended Effects? A Literature Review
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Information Warfare. - 1445-3312. ; 21:2, s. 21-35
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The purpose of this paper is to review the scientific basis for claiming any effect of foreign information operations. The literature on information operations is reviewed, as well as other kinds of persuasive communication (advertising, risk and health communication) that aims to change attitudes or behaviour. Most research indicates that persuasive communication in general has little effect on receiver attitudes and/or behaviour. Some hypothetical strategies that may increase the effect are formulated, such as hiding the sender’s intent, sending messages not too distant from the receiver’s present views, or using the emotional, rather than the rational, route.
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