| 1. |
- Blomberg, Johan, et al.
(författare)
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Actual and non-actual motion: why experientialist semantics needs phenomenology (and vice versa)
- 2014
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Ingår i: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1568-7759 .- 1572-8676. ; 13:3, s. 395-418
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, through a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada. Through a phenomenological re-analysis of proposals of Talmy, Langacker and Matlock, we show that non-actual motion is both experientially and linguistically non-unitary. At least three different features of human consciousness – enactive perception, visual scanning and imagination –constitute experiential motivations for non-actual motion sentences, and each of these could be related to phenomenological analyses of human intentionality. The second problem is addressed by proposing that the experiential motivations of non-actual motion sentences can be viewed as sedimented through “passive” processes of acquisition and social transmission, and that this implies an interactive loop between experience and language, yielding losses in terms of original experience, but gains in terms of communal signification. Something that is underestimated by phenomenology is that what is sedimented are not only intentional objects such as states of affairs, but aspects of how they are given, i.e. the original, temporal, bodily experiences themselves. Since cognitive semantics has emphasized such aspects of meaning, we suggest that phenomenology can itself benefit from experientialist semantics, especially when it turns its focus from pre-predicative to predicative, linguistic intentionality.
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| 2. |
- Brinck, Ingar, et al.
(författare)
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Dialogue in the making : Emotional engagement with materials
- 2020
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Ingår i: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1572-8676 .- 1568-7759. ; 19:1, s. 23-45
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Taking a psychological and philosophical outlook, we approach making as an embodied and embedded skill via the skilled artisan’s experience of having a corporeal, nonlinguistic dialogue with the material while working with it. We investigate the dynamic relation between maker and material through the lens of pottery as illustrated by wheel throwing, claiming that the experience of dialogue signals an emotional involvement with clay. The examination of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of habit, the skilled intentionality framework, and material engagement theory show that while these theories explain complementary aspects of skilful engagement with the material world, they do not consider the dialogic dimension. By way of explanation, we submit that the artisan’s emotional engagement with the material world is based in openness and recognition and involves dialogue with the material. Drawing on the intimate relationship between movement and emotion, it promotes an open-ended manner of working and permits experiencing with the material, acting into its inherent possibilities. In conclusion, we suggest that dialogue, whether verbal or nonverbal, constitutes a primary means for making sense of the world at large, animate and inanimate.
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| 3. |
- Brinck, Ingar
(författare)
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Understanding social norms and constitutive rules : Perspectives from developmental psychology and philosophy
- 2015
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Ingår i: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1568-7759 .- 1572-8676. ; 14:4, s. 699-718
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A recent experimental paradigm that tests young children’s understanding of social norms by modelling norms on Searle’s notion of constitutive rule is examined. The experiments and the reasons provided for their design are discussed in detail. The concepts of a social norm and of a constitutive rule are compared, and it is shown that they are distinct. It is argued that the experiments do not provide direct evidence for the development of social norms. The experimental data are re-interpreted, and suggestions for how to deal with the present criticism are presented. It is suggested that normativity emerges from interaction, and that learning to comply with social norms involves an understanding of the distinctions among their content, enforcement, and acceptance.
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| 4. |
- Englander, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Phenomenological psychology and qualitative research
- 2023
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Ingår i: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. - : Springer. - 1568-7759 .- 1572-8676. ; 22:1, s. 25-53
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article presents the tradition of phenomenologically founded psychological research that was originally initiated by Amedeo Giorgi. This data analysis method is inseparable from the broader project of establishing an autonomous phenomenologically based human scientific psychology. After recounting the history of the method from the 1960's to the present, we explain the rationale for why we view data collection as a process that should be adaptable to the unique mode of appearance of each particular phenomenon being researched. The substance of the article is then devoted to a detailed outline of the method's whole-part-whole procedure of data analysis. We then offer a sample analysis of a brief description of an ordinary daydream. This is an anxiety daydream in response to the recent Covid-19 pandemic. We present this daydream analysis in full to show the concrete hands-on 5 step process through which the researcher explicated the participants' expressions from the particular to the general. From this brief sample analysis, the researcher offers a first-person reflection on the data analysis process to offer the reader an introduction to the diacritical nature of phenomenological psychological elucidation.
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| 5. |
- Foultier, Anna Petronella
(författare)
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Letting the body find its way: skills, expertise, and Bodily Reflection
- 2023
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Ingår i: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. - : Springer. - 1568-7759 .- 1572-8676. ; 22:4, s. 799-820
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- What forms of consciousness can the subject have of her body in action? This is a recurrent issue in contemporary research on skilled movement and expertise, and according to a widespread view, the body makes itself inconspicuous in performance in favour of the object or goal that the activity is directed to. However, this attitude to consciousness in bodily performance seems unsatisfying for an understanding of skilled action, and the work of several researchers can be seen as responding to this view: Montero, Legrand, Ravn and others in the philosophy of expertise and of dance have developed various notions of consciousness and cognition to account for the mindful processes at play in performance.Two related questions can be distinguished here: (1) Is there an inherent conflict between skilled action and at least more than marginal awareness of that action, or is it possible – and even desirable – to reflect on our own performance without considerably impeding on it? (2) What forms of consciousness pertaining to the body in action must we distinguish in order to answer the first question?This paper gives an overview of this discussion, focusing on the second issue, although the first will come into play in so far as it is linked with the latter question. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of bodily reflection and on dancers’ descriptions, I show that there is, in phenomenological terms, a bodily level of reflection: a fully conscious and exploratory activity that is led by the skilled body, and that is explicitly aimed at by many performers.
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| 6. |
- Henriksen, Mads Gram, et al.
(författare)
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Methods of data collection in psychopathology : the role of semi-structured, phenomenological interviews
- 2021
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Ingår i: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. - : Springer. - 1568-7759 .- 1572-8676. ; 21, s. 9-30
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Research in psychopathology is booming in an unprecedented way, at least, in terms of increasing number of publications. Yet, a few questions arise: Does quantity also give us quality? Are the collected data generally of sound quality? How are data typically collected in psychopathology? Are the applied methods of data collection appropriate for this particular field of study? This article explores three different methods of data collection in psychopathology, namely self-rating scales, structured interviews, and semi-structured, phenomenological interviews. To identify the most adequate methodological approach, we first establish the nature of the object of psychopathology and then we critically assess each method’s appropriateness to this field of study. We emphasize fundamental issues that make self-rating scales and structured interviews unfit for the task of adequately examining psychopathology. By contrast, we propose that a semi-structured, phenomenological interview presents a more appropriate method. Finally, we describe two types of semi-structured, phenomenological interviews that can be applied to assess and explore psychopathology, respectively.
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| 7. |
- León, Felipe
(författare)
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Being one of us: we-identities and self-categorization theory
- 2023
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Ingår i: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. - : SPRINGER. - 1568-7759 .- 1572-8676.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- One way to theorize about we-identities-the identities that individual subjects have as one of us-is in terms of the uniformity, interchangeability, and prototypicality of group members. The social-psychological theory of self-categorization epitomizes this approach, which has strongly influenced contemporary phenomenological research on the we. This paper argues that this approach has one important and largely overlooked limitation: the we-identities tied to close personal relationships-exemplified by long-term friendships and romantic partnerships-are based on patterns of interpersonal interaction and integration through which individuals tend to grasp their non-substitutability and complementarity. This limitation suggests that another approach is needed to tackle the we-identities characteristic of close personal relationships. I outline such an approach, by combining resources from classical phenomenology and ongoing research on the socially extended mind.
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Saury, Jean-Michel, 1951
(författare)
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The phenomenology of negation
- 2009
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Ingår i: PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1568-7759 .- 1572-8676. ; 8:2, s. 245-260
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 10. |
- Svenaeus, Fredrik, 1966-
(författare)
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Edith Stein’s phenomenology of sensual and emotional empathy
- 2018
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Ingår i: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. - : Springer. - 1568-7759 .- 1572-8676. ; 17:4, s. 741-760
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper presents and explicates the theory of empathy found in Edith Stein’s early philosophy, notably in the book On the Problem of Empathy, published in 1917, but also by proceeding from complementary thoughts on bodily intentionality and intersubjectivity found in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities published in 1922. In these works Stein puts forward an innovative and detailed theory of empathy, which is developed in the framework of a philosophical anthropology involving questions of psychophysical causality, social ontology and moral philosophy. Empathy, according to Stein, is a feeling-based experience of another person’s feeling that develops throughout three successive steps on two interrelated levels. The key to understanding the empathy process á la Stein is to explicate how the steps of empathy are attuned in nature, since the affective qualities provide the energy and logic by way of which the empathy process is not only inaugurated but also proceeds through the three steps and carries meaning on two different levels corresponding to two different types of empathy: sensual and emotional empathy. Stein’s theory has great potential for better understanding and moving beyond some major disagreements found in the contemporary empathy debate regarding, for instance, the relation between perception and simulation, the distinction between what is called low-level and high-level empathy, and the issue of how and in what sense it may be possible to share feelings in the empathy process. © 2017 The Author(s)
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