| 1. |
- Albano, GL, et al.
(författare)
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Regulating Joint Bidding in Procurement
- 2009
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Ingår i: Journal of Competition Law and Economics. - : Oxford University Press. - 1744-6414 .- 1744-6422. ; 5:2, s. 335-360
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Joint bidding is the practice of two or more independent suppliers submitting a single bid, a widespread practice in private and public procurement. This practice may generate efficiencies through synergies and information sharing, but may also be abused to reduce the number of competitors or—even worse—to facilitate or enforce collusion among them; therefore, it is often regulated. In this paper, we first present results from a survey on the regulation of joint bidding in European public procurement, documenting how the existence and the type of regulation differ across countries, and that—where present—regulation is often related to the ability of an individual firm to be admitted as a solo bidder. Borrowing from the theories of joint bidding in auctions and of horizontal mergers and joint ventures in oligopoly, we then review the basic economics of bidding consortia and the effects that these can have in terms of bidding competition, coordination among firms, risk management, exploitation of other synergies, and entry. Finally, we assess the relative degrees of restrictiveness of several practical criteria that could be used to create consistent regulatory requirements for bidding consortia in public procurement. The only strong conclusion that we can draw is that there is an urgent need for further theoretical and empirical or experimental research on this very important issue for public procurement.
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| 2. |
- Bergman, Mats A., 1964-, et al.
(författare)
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Does Merger Policy Converge After the 2004 European Union Reform?
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of Competition Law and Economics. - : Oxford University Press. - 1744-6414 .- 1744-6422. ; 15:1, s. 664-689
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The European Union (EU) formally changed its merger policy in 2004, moving from a dominance standard to one based on a significant impediment of effective competition, which appears more closely aligned with the U.S. substantial lessening of competition standard. We use data from both before and after this reform to explore whether EU policy has converged toward the U.S. standard. We start by identifying changes in the EU regime and detect a softer EU policy for unilateral effects. We model the outcomes of EU and U.S. investigations with logit models and use their predictions in decompositions and other exercises to show policy convergence for unilateral effects cases.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Luz, Reinaldo Diogo, et al.
(författare)
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Leniency, Collusion, Corruption, and Whistleblowing
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of Competition Law and Economics. - : Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option C. - 1744-6422 .- 1744-6414. ; 13:4, s. 729-766
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Leniency policies offering immunity to the first cartel member that blows the whistle and self-reports to the antitrust authority have become the main instrument in the fight against price-fixing conspiracies around the world. In public procurement markets, however, bid-rigging schemes are often accompanied by corruption of public officials. In the absence of coordinated forms of leniency (or rewards) for unveiling corruption, a policy offering immunity from antitrust sanctions may not be sufficient to encourage wrongdoers to blow the whistle, as the leniency recipient will then be exposed to the risk of conviction for corruption. This article assesses the extent of this problem by describing and discussing the antitrust and anti-corruption provisions present in a few selected countries, under both common law and civil law regimes. For each of these countries, we try to evaluate whether the legal system presents any solution to limiting the risk that legal provisions against corruption undermine the effectiveness of leniency programs against bid rigging in public procurement. Legal harmonization, coordination, and co-operation on procedural and substantive issues, and inter- and intra-jurisdictions, seem essential to solve this problem. Given the size of public procurement markets and their propensity for cartelization, specific improvements in legislation appear necessary in all the countries considered. Explicitly introducing leniency policies for corruption, as has been done recently in Brazil and Mexico and is being experimented in the United States, is only a first step. The antitrust experience has taught us that to achieve their goals of inducing whistleblowing, these policies must be carefully designed and sufficiently generous with (only) the first reporting party, they should not be discretional, they must be backed by robust sanctions, and they must be consistently implemented. Hence, the road ahead appears a long one. To increase the effectiveness of leniency in multiple offense cases, we suggest, besides extending automatic leniency to individual criminal sanctions, the creation of a "one-stop point" enabling firms and individuals to report different crimes simultaneously and receive leniency for all of them at once if they are entitled to it. As long as individual criminal charges are not covered by a coordinated and nondiscretional leniency program, there is little hope that these provisions will induce any improvement in the fight against corrupting cartels. A more effective way to fight such cartels may then be offering Qui Tam rewards to nonaccomplice whistleblowers, as is already done with apparent success by several law enforcement agencies in the United States. © The Author(s) 2017.
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| 5. |
- Olykke, Grith Skovgaard, et al.
(författare)
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Defining abnormally low tenders : A comparison between Sweden and Denmark
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of Competition Law and Economics. - : Oxford University Press. - 1744-6414 .- 1744-6422. ; 13:4, s. 666-709
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The concept of an abnormally low tender is not defined in EU public procurement law. This article takes an interdisciplinary law and economics approach to examine a dataset consisting of Swedish and Danish judgments and verdicts concerning the concept of an abnormally low tender. The purpose is to determine how the concept has developed in practice in two Scandinavian countries with similar legal traditions, and whether the national solutions are economically efficient. The data indicate that economic operators use various pricing strategies which may result in tenders being rejected as abnormally low or the awards of contracts to such tenders being contested. The pricing strategies will (over time) result in the contracting authorities paying too high a price and they are, therefore, economically inefficient. It is concluded that diverse solutions to the handling of abnormally low tenders have developed in the two countries and, notably, that the approaches differ with regard to how they treat different pricing strategies. Thus, the solutions are also different in terms of economic efficiency.
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| 6. |
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, et al.
(författare)
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Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: The competition policy indexes
- 2011
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Ingår i: Journal of Competition Law and Economics. - : Oxford University Press. - 1744-6414 .- 1744-6422. ; 7:1, s. 165-204
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article describes in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, the Competition Policy Indexes (CPIs). The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a jurisdiction's competition policy—where by competition policy, we mean the antitrust legislation including the merger control provisions and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime (particularly information on the legal framework, the institutional settings, and the enforcement tools of each jurisdiction that we examine) score against a benchmark of generally agreed-upon best practices and summarize them, so as to allow cross-country and cross-time comparisons. We calculate the CPIs for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period from 1995 to 2005.
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| 7. |
- Tzanaki, Anna
(författare)
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Varieties and Mechanisms of Common Ownership: A Calibration Exercise for Competition Policy
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Competition Law & Economics. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1744-6414 .- 1744-6422. ; 18:1, s. 168-254
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. Recent empirical studies, however, draw attention to a new, thought-provoking theory of harm: common ownership by institutional investors holding small, parallel equity positions in several competing firms within concentrated industries. While critical voices abound, EU and U.S. antitrust agencies closely follow these developments indicating an appetite to act. This article connects the common ownership debate to merger control and explores: i) the aims and scope of legal control as regards partial acquisitions in different jurisdictions; ii) the nature of potential competition effects arising from passive minority shareholding; and iii) the plausibility of common owners' anticompetitive strategies from a corporate governance perspective. Drawing a distinction between "concentrated" and "diffuse" common ownership, it sheds light on the different supporting mechanisms and varying harm potential of each variety. "Passive influence "mechanisms characterizing "diffuse" common ownership may not only generate plausible and material competition concerns in given circumstances but present challenges for the effective jurisdictional and remedial design of merger law frameworks. Competition policy should stay current by explicitly recognizing these novel insights in enforcement practice and developing guidelines on how to treat common ownership cases in the future.
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| 8. |
- Bjuresäter, Kaisa, 1970-, et al.
(författare)
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Patients’ experiences of home enteral tube feeding (HETF) : a qualitative study
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of research in nursing. - : Sage Publications. - 1744-9871 .- 1744-988X. ; 20:7, s. 552-565
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Use of home enteral tube feeding (HETF) has increased in Western countries but research is scarce, especially about patients’ experiences of daily life when being treated with HETF. This study aimed to explore what it means to live with HETF and how the situation can be managed. A qualitative method was carried out according to Grounded Theory. In total, 22 interviews were performed with 11 patients treated with HETF for between 8 weeks and 2 years, using open-ended questions. Sampling, data collection and data analysis were carried out simultaneously. To be treated with HETF was experienced as positive as it meant survival, but the most prominent finding told about experiences of restrictions, practical problems and distress in the patients’ daily lives. How daily life turned out seemed to depend on the patient’s ability to manage problems, but was also strongly related to the amount and quality of information and support they received from health professionals. Lacking preparation before discharge as well as lacking support at home meant insecurity and uncertainty. The findings stress the need for comprehensive preparation and support from health professionals, and improvements are needed to facilitate HETF patients’ daily life.
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