| 1. |
- Collin, Sven-Olof Yrjö, 1957-
(författare)
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The boards functional emphasis – A contingency approach
- 2008
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Ingår i: Corporate Ownership & Control. - Sumy : Virtus Interpress. - 1727-9232 .- 1810-3057. ; 4:2, s. 24-39
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The understanding of the board of a corporation and its behavior is limited, despite the board’s societalimportance. We present a contingency approach to the board’s functional emphasis, considering afourth function in addition to monitoring, decision making, and service or resource provision. Theadditional function is conflict resolution (or principal identification). The approach contrasts withmainstream research by assuming that the firm is a nexus of investments, avoiding the empiricalassumption that the shareholder is the sole principal. We derive propositions that are not restricted toany empirical category of a corporation, and address praxis implications for managing functionaldisharmony.
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| 2. |
- Jansson, Andreas, 1978-
(författare)
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No Exit! : The logic of defensive shareholder activism
- 2014
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Ingår i: Corporate Board. - : Virtus Interpress. - 1810-8601 .- 2312-2722. ; 10:2, s. 16-31
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper examines the issue of what motivates shareholder activism. The standard explanation portrays shareholder activism as a response to poor corporate performance, but the empirical literature provides inconclusive support, indicating the need for alternative or complementary explanations. This paper contributes to the literature by showing, with the help of a case study, that shareholder activism can also be a response to increasing costs for exiting the investment, making outside shareholders increasingly exposed to expropriation risks. Significant expropriation risk can antecede a defensive type of shareholder activism characterized by intensified monitoring and reactive intervention to fend off expropriation attempts, which differs from the standard explanation in both motivation and outcome.
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| 3. |
- Lantz, B., et al.
(författare)
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Incentive Schemes and Female Leadership in Financial Firms
- 2013
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Ingår i: Corporate Board. - : Virtus Interpress. - 1810-8601 .- 2312-2722. ; 9:1, s. 40-49
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Purpose: To explore how performance in Swedish financial companies is affected by the presence of a female chief executive officer (CEO), the presence of an incentive scheme, and the proportion of female board members. Design/methodology/approach: Our sample consists of data from the last 10 years of all the 43 companies within GICS 40 listed at the Swedish stock exchange OMX Stockholm. We used multiple regressions to explore the association between the explanatory and firm performance variables. Findings: The results indicate that a female CEO is associated with a lower return on equity (ROE) and a lower Tobin’s Q, but we find no significant association between the proportion of female board members and firm performance. An incentive scheme is generally associated with a lower return on assets (ROA) and a higher Tobin’s Q. In particular, a share-based incentive scheme is associated with a lower ROA, a lower ROE, and a higher Tobin’s Q. Originality/value: To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to analyse governance in financial firms with respect to female leadership as well as to incentive schemes. We conclude that governance structures in financial firms need to balance accounting-based and market-based performance. A large focus on share prices, especially at a certain time, may create short-term effects that need not necessarily be optimal in the long run for shareholders.
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| 4. |
- Lantz, Björn, 1967, et al.
(författare)
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Incentive Schemes and Female Leadership in Financial Firms
- 2013
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Ingår i: Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition. - 2312-2722 .- 1810-8601. ; 9, s. 40-49
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Our purpose is to explore how performance in Swedish financial companies is affected by the presence of a female chief executive officer (CEO), the presence of an incentive scheme, and the proportion of female board members. The results indicate that a female CEO is associated with alower return on equity (ROE) and a lower Tobin’s Q, but we find no significant association between the proportion of female board members and firm performance. An incentive scheme is generally associated with a lower return on assets (ROA) and a higher Tobin’s Q. In particular, ashare-based incentive scheme is associated with a lower ROA, a lower ROE, and a higher Tobin’s Q.
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| 5. |
- Gabrielsson, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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“Outside” directors in SME boards: a call for theoretical reflections
- 2005
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Ingår i: Corporate Board: Roles, Duties & Composition. - Sumy, Ukraine : Virtus InterPress. - 2312-2722. ; 1:1, s. 28-37
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Good governance for SMEs is critical for economic development and growth in both developed and developing economies. In this paper we focus on boards and governance in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by investigating the role and contribution of “outside” directors in this setting. By contrasting board role theories against different types of SMEs, firms are expected to recruit “outside” board members for various reasons. Illustrated by 53 empirical studies of “outside” directors in SMEs we show how agency theory, resource based view of the firm, and resource dependence theory can be applied to understand the multiple roles of “outside” directors in family firms, venture capital-backed firms and other SMEs. The illustration shows that the concept “outside” director is not the same in different theories and in different empirical settings. Based on this finding, we argue for the need to have a conscious and balanced use of theories when understanding the role and contribution of “outside” directors in SMEs.
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