| 1. |
- Andersson, Emil, 1982-
(författare)
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Autonomy, Community, and the Justification of Public Reason
- 2024
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press. - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recently, there have been attempts at offering new justifications of the Rawlsian idea of public reason. Blain Neufeld has suggested that the ideal of political autonomy justifies public reason, while R.J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen have sought to justify the idea by appealing to the value of political community. In this paper, I show that both proposals are vulnerable to a common problem. In realistic circumstances, they will often turn into reasons to oppose, rather than support, public reason. However, this counterintuitive result can be avoided if we conceive of autonomy and community differently.
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| 2. |
- Brandstedt, Eric
(författare)
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The Savings Problem in the Original Position : Assessing and Revising a Model
- 2017
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Ingår i: Canadian Journal of Philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1911-0820 .- 0045-5091. ; 47:2-3, s. 269-289
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The common conception of justice as reciprocity seemingly is inapplicable to relations between non-overlapping generations. This is a challenge also to John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. This text responds to this by way of reinterpreting and developing Rawls’s theory. First, by examining the original position as a model, some revisions of it are shown to be wanting. Second, by drawing on the methodology of constructivism, an alternative solution is proposed: an amendment to the primary goods named ‘sustainability of values’. This revised original position lends support to intergenerational justice as fairness.
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| 3. |
- Brunnander, Björn
(författare)
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On the theoretical motivation for positing etiological functions
- 2011
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 41:3, s. 371-390
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper argues that the widely accepted etiological notion of function finds no solid support in biological theory. While the notion may seem to be called for by entrenched linguistic practice, I claim that the arguments that have been raised in its favour do not succeed in providing a theoretical motivation for it. This verdict is bound to transfer to philosophical contexts where the notion is put to use, teleosemantics being the perhaps most debated application.
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| 4. |
- Eklund, Matti, 1974-
(författare)
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Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness
- 2008
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 38, s. 117-140
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 5. |
- Eklund, Matti, 1974-
(författare)
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What are Thick Concepts?
- 2011
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 41, s. 25-49
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 6. |
- Franzén, Nils, 1987-
(författare)
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A sensibilist explanation of imaginative resistance
- 2021
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press. - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 51:3, s. 159-174
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article discusses why it is the case that we refuse to accept strange evaluative claims as being true in fictions, even though we are happy to go along with other types of absurdities in such contexts. For instance, we would refuse to accept the following statement as true, even in the context of a fiction: (i) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl.This article offers a sensibilist diagnosis of this puzzle, inspired by an observation first made by David Hume. According to sensibilism, the way we feel about things settles their evaluative properties. Thus, when confronted with a fictional scenario where the configuration of non-evaluative facts and properties is relevantly similar to the actual world, we refuse to go along with evaluative properties being instantiated according to a different pattern. It is the attitudes we hold in the actual world that fix the extension of evaluative terms, even in nonactual worlds. When engaging with a fiction, we (to some extent) leave our beliefs about what the world is like behind, while taking our emotional attitudes with us into the fiction.To substantiate this diagnosis, this paper outlines a sensibilist semantics for evaluative terms based on recent discussion regarding predicates of personal taste, and explains how, together with standard assumptions about the nature of fictional discourse, it makes the relevant predictions with respect to engagement with fictions.
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| 7. |
- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979
(författare)
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Utilitarianism without Moral Aggregation
- 2021
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Ingår i: Canadian Journal of Philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 51:4, s. 256-269
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better because it has a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves a controversial form of moral aggregation, because it is based on a comparison between aggregates of different people's well-being. Still, an alternative justification-the Argument for Best Outcomes-does not involve moral aggregation. I extend the Argument for Best Outcomes to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation.
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| 8. |
- Hattiangadi, Anandi, 1973-
(författare)
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Moral Supervenience
- 2018
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 48:3-4, s. 592-615
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.
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| 9. |
- Häggqvist, Sören
(författare)
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A Model for Thought Experiments
- 2009
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 39:1, s. 55-76
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Philosophical interest in thought experiments has grown over the last couple of decades. Several positions have emerged, defined largely by their differing responses to a perceived epistemological challenge: how do thought experiments yield justified belief revision, even in science, when they provide no new empirical data? Attitudes towards this supposed explanandum differ. Many philosophers accept that it poses a genuine puzzle and hence seek to provide a substantive explanation. Others reject or deflate the epistemic claims made for thought experiments.In this paper I present a model for many thought experiments in philosophy and science. The model doesn't assume that thought experiments in fact manage to achieve epistemic justifi cation, but it allows us to see how they aspire to do so. It also emphasises both the parallels and the discrepancies between thought experiments and ordinary scientific experiments.
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| 10. |
- Matheson, Benjamin
(författare)
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Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility
- 2019
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 49:4, s. 458-480
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, I propose and defend a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility. According to the condition I propose, an agent owns a mental item if and only if it is part of or is partly grounded by a coherent set of psychological states. As I discuss, other theorists have proposed or alluded to conditions like psychological coherence, but each proposal is unsatisfactory in some way. My account appeals to narrative explanation to elucidate the relevant sense of psychological coherence.
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