| 1. |
- Andersson, Fredrik
(författare)
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Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures
- 2011
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Economics. - : Walter de Gruyter GmbH. - 1935-1704. ; 11:1
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple framework combining contractual incompleteness with the existence of an imperfect but contractible performance measure. Contractual incompleteness gives rise to two regimes, identified with make and buy. The performance measure on which comprehensive contracts can be written is imperfect in the sense of being subject to manipulation. The performance incentives faced by the agent are stronger in the “buy” regime. A positive (negative) impact – or ”externality” – of manipulation on true performance favors make (buy).
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games
- 2010
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Economics. - : Walter de Gruyter GmbH. - 1935-1704. ; 10:1, Article 51
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost, there exists a discount factor such that any collusive profit can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suffice to facilitate collusive outcomes for sufficiently patient firms. This result stands in stark contrast to the unique pure strategy WRP equilibrium without renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period. Moreover, in comparison to the findings of Mc-Cutcheon (1997), who states that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this result points to a quite different conclusion.
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| 3. |
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, et al.
(författare)
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Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A ‘Large Lot Last’ Policy
- 2010
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Ingår i: BE Journal of Theoretical Economics. - : De Gruyter. - 1935-1704 .- 2194-6124. ; 10:1, s. 1-16
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Sequential procurement of multiple contracts/lots is widespread and often regularly repeated.We analyze how sequentiality and its interaction with asymmetries across bidders and lots affect the sustainability of supplier/bidder collusion. Sequential procurement stabilizes supplier collusion (compared to simultaneous procurement) by allowing not only to identify or punish deviations within the sequence, but also to allocate the “last lot” to the bidder with the highest incentive to defect. We then analyze how to counteract these effects by exploiting (or creating) asymmetries in the value of lots, finding that the most effective policy procures the most valuable lot at the end of each sequence.
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| 4. |
- Lindblom, Ted, 1956, et al.
(författare)
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A Theoretical Analysis of Collusion Involving Technology Licensing Under Diseconomies of Scale
- 2024
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Ingår i: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - 1935-1704. ; 24:1, s. 263-297
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study focuses on firms with cost-efficient technology that use licensing to influence product market behaviour, market prices and outputs and the resulting welfare effects. We show how licensing fees can be constructed that lead to identical collective industry outputs as under collusion while industry output is equal to or higher than that achieved under competition and sustained in equilibrium. Hence, consumers are either indifferent to firms’ collusion or better off when they do collude, whereas firms (producers) are always better off due to the improved cost efficiency of integrating the new production technology. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why technology licensing is observed in highly concentrated industries characterised by significant diseconomies of scale relative to demand. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating how technology licensing involving collusion can reduce the dissipation effect and improve social welfare in oligopolistic industries. An important policy implication is that collusion involving technology licensing should not always be challenged by antitrust authorities, particularly when it does not transfer welfare from consumers to producers.
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